

Ponte sullo Stretto di Messina PROGETTO DEFINITIVO

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1 Introduction

The Calculation Report gives an overview of the results of the design calculations witch has been carried out for the Progetto Definitivo, Mechanical and Electrical systems. Lighting calculations are presented in report no. CG1000-P4RDPITE2SI000000-01.

2 Power supply

2.1 Purpose of calculation

A power system study of the electrical network for the Messina Strait Bridge has been performed. The aim of the power system study is to verify that:

- the voltage will be kept within the guidelines of CEI 64\8
- the electrical network can be built of standard equipment

The followring calculations are performed to verify that the above requriments are fullfiled:

- Load study
- Loadflow calculations
- Short circuit calculations

Selectivity calculations will be performed during the Projetto Esecutivo phase.

The power system study covers the electrical network from the 20kV incomers in substation QMT-SS-Sicilia and QMT-SS-Calabria, the entire 6kV distribution network and critical parts of the low voltage network. The critical parts are circuits or switchboards where the highest or lowest voltages and short circuits levels are identified.

2.2 Calculation basis

Electric power for the Messina Strait Bridge is distributed along the bridge deck through two 6kV cables connecting the two substations QMT-G-Sicilia and QMT-G-Calabria. Radials feed from the two substations QMT-G-Sicilia and QMT-G-Calabria are supplying substations in anchor blocks, towers and in the fire and drainage houses.

Power suppliers to the network are:

- 1. ENEL utility supply to the substation QMT-SS-Sicily at 20kV.
- 2. ENEL utility supply at the substation QMT-SS-Calabria at 20kV.
- 3. Emergency generators located in substation QMT-G-Sicily and in substation QMT-G-Calabria

The present maximum short circuit level of the ENEL power supply is I_k =12.5kA. To prepare the power supply system for future extension of the ENEL utility network, a maximum short circuit level of I_k =31.5kA have been used for the calculations.

A check calculation with $I_k=12.5kA$ and $I_k=31.5kA$ have been performed in order to analyse influence of the ENEL short circuit level on the calculation results.

It is concluded that the value for the short circuit level will have very limited and no significant influence on the system calculation result and will not influence design of the 6kV network and its components. The short circuit current will only influence design requirement for the 20 kV switchgear. In order to comply with todays short circuit level at 20 kV feeder the switchgear may be provided with 16 kA short circuit design level (Corrente di breve durata 1s (kA)). In order to allow for future increase of short circuit level in the ENEL grid the required short circuit withstand current for main substation 20kV switchgear will be either 20 kA or 31.5kA and final decision will be taken after negotiations with ENEL in the Projetto Esecutivo phase.

The voltage variation of the ENEL power supply is assumed to be less than $\pm 1\%$ of U_n.

The power distribution system can be operated under different conditions. Calculations are performed for the following three operation scenarios:

Operation scenario 1: The coupling configuration at normal operation. The distribution network is supplied from both the Sicily and Calabria side. The two cables connecting QMT-G-Sicily and QMT-G-Calabria are operated as an open ring as shown in Figure 1.

Operation scenario 2: Fault or maintenance coupling configuration with utility supply from one side only. The power supply from either QMT-SS-Sicily or QMT-SS-Calabria is interrupted and the entire bridge will be supplied from one side only as shown in Figure 2.

Operation scenario 3: Fault or maintenance coupling configuration with emergency generators supplying the network. The 6kV incomers at QMT-G-Sicily or QMT-G-Calabria are open and the two cable systems crossing the bridge is operated as an open ring. The Sicily and Calabria side of the distribution network are feed from their own 1.6MVA generator as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 1- Operation scenario 1.

- **Closed Circuit Breaker**
- **Transformer**
- **G Emergency Diesel Generator**

Figure 2 – Operation scenario 2.

Figure 3 – Operation scenario 3.

2.3 Load study

Power demand is calculated for night and daylight periods for operation scenario 1 and 2.

Table 1 summarizes the results of the load study. The largest load demand is determined to be

2400kW for operation scenario 1 at night time when both road and architectural lighting is on.

Tables sumerizing the load demand for the main low voltage switchboard and the main UPS switchbord in each substation are also shown. The switchbords are BLA01, BNB01, BLA02, BNB02, BLA03, BNB03, BLA04, BNB04 BLA05, BNB05, BLA06, BNB06, BLA07, BNB07, BLA08, BNB08, BLA11, BNB11, BLA12, BNB12, BLA13, BNB13, BLA14, BLA21, BNB21, BLA22, BNB22, BLA23, BNB23, BLA24, BLA31, BNB31, BLA41, BNB41, BHA10, BNB10, BHA20, BNB20, BHA51 and BHA61. Switchboards named BLAXX or BHAXX is the main low voltage switchboard of each substation and BHBXX is the main UPS-supplied switchboard of each substation.

The load distributed on transformers are presented in Table 2. Diversity coefficients are determined as the average diversity coefficients of the equipment supplied by each transformer. The diversity coefficients are lowest for transformers on the bridge deck where a large part of the connected load is internal lighting which is rarely on. The capacity utilization rate of the transformers is between 14% and 98%.

The capacity utilization of the transformers installed in the fire and drainage houses (BLT13, BLT14, BLT23 and BLT24) is only about 30%, since each transformer is sized to backup up the entire load demand of the fire and drainage house where it is installed. In a backup situation where one transformer is interrupted the utilization of the remaining transformer will be approximately 60%.

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Table 1 – Summary of load study.

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Table 2 – Load distribution on transformers

2.3.1 UPS load

The calculated UPS sizes are presented in the Table 3. All UPS are single phase and located in the substations. Diversity coefficients and backup time for the equipment is shown in the table below.

The UPS units will provide power backup for all UPS-loads including emergency lighting in the

bridge girders. Emergency light are feed from the UPS system. Internal battery back-up in light fixtures is not used due to the short life span, and high maintenance cost.

Table 3 - UPS loads.

2.4 Current carrying capacity and short time withstand currents

The current carrying capacities of the cables are determined in accordance with IEC 60364.

The current carrying capacity depends on cable type, installation configuration and ambient conditions. The followring conditions forms a basis for the calculations:

- A maximum conductor temperature of 90°C.
- An air temperature of 43°C, which equals the the maximum enviorenmental temperature at sea level.
- Cables are installed on cable ladders, or perforated cable trays.

• Cables are layed in not more than one layer.

The calculated current carrying capacities of the cables are presented in Table 4.

The highest 1 second short time currents are also listed in Table 4. The short time currents are based on an initial cable conductor temperature of 50°C and a final temperature of 250°C.

Table 4 - Current carrying capacity and short time current withstand capacity of cables.

2.5 Power system model

The power system study is made by use of the calculation software Neplan version 5.4.4 developed and maintained by ABB. More information about Neplan can be down loaded on

www.neplan.com.

Neplan has a graphical user interface where all electrical components are represented by symbols. The configuration of the network is represented by connecting all the components with lines as in a single line diagram. Electrical characteristics of all components and lines in the network can be defined and calculations can be executed.

The calculation cowers all transformers and switchboards at 20kV and 6kV level. At the low voltage level only a few parts of the network is comprised in the Neplan calculations. These parts are identified to be the most critical (worst case) parts of the LV network. In relation with voltage drop and minimum short circuits critical parts are mainly due to large loads, long cables, small cross section of cables, and small transformers. When calculating maximum voltages and maximum short circuits the most critical parts are at the primary side of the transformers and close to the main supply point or generation unit.

When the most critical parts meet the requirements it can be assumed that the requirements are also fulfilled in the rest of the LV network.

A graphical overview of the Neplan calculation is presented in Figure 4. Main parts of the calculation sheet are indicated on the figure by numbers from 1 to 13. An explanation to each marked part is provided in the item list below.

Figure 4 – Screen print of electrical network represented in Neplan.More details are provided in section 2.8.

- 1. Feeder to network at 20kV level at Sicily side.
- 2. Feeder to network at 20kV level at Calabria side.
- 3. Substation QMT-G-Sicily.
- 4. Substation QMT-G-Calabria.
- 5. The two cable systems connecting QMT-G-Sicily and QMT-G-Calabria at 6kV level.
- 6. Low voltage switchboard BLA08. Calculations are performed for BLA08 because substation QMT-A8 with regards to supply distance is the most distant bridge

substation at operation scenario 2 where the network is supplied from the Sicilian side only.

- 7. Road lighting circuit with the largest number of lighting poles in total 21.
- 8. Dehumidification unit with a load demand of 60kW. The dehumidification unit is located 270m from a substation which makes it the most distant located dehumidification unit from its supply source.
- 9. Switchboard FM-29A (bus BLB81) located most distant from BLA08. The length of the cable between BLA08 and FM-29A is 450m.
- 10. Circuits feeding service lane lighting, cross girder lighting and girder lighting. The circuits are feed from switchboard FM-29A.
- 11. Low voltage switchboard BLA21 located in tower substation QMT-A21. Calculations are performed for BLA21 because substation QMT-A21 is the most distant tower substation for operation scenario 2 where the network is supplied from the Sicilian side only.
- 12. Distribution panel DPB-72 located in the top of the Calabria tower. The distribution panel DPB-72 are feeding circuits for architectural lighting.
- 13. Circuit feeding architectural spotlights on hanger cables. The circuit are feeding 2x13 spotlights. The load consumption of each spot light is 150W. The total length of the supply cable is 800m.

The Network supplied by UPS is studied in a separate NEPLAN sheet, since another calculation module must be used. An overview of the Neplan calculation sheet is presented in Figure 5. Main parts of the calculation sheets are indicated on the figure by numbers from 1 to 5. An explanation to each marked part is provided in the item list below.

Figure 5 - Screen print of electrical UPS network represented in Neplan.

- 1. Feeder representing the UPS.
- 2. UPS switchboard BNB08 in substation QMT-A8.
- 3. End of circuit feeding a VMS portal located most distant from a substation. The length of the supply cable is 300m. To count in the return circuit of the single phase circuit a conductor length of 600m is used for the calculations.
- 4. Switchboard FM-29A (bus BNC81) located most distant from BNB08. The electrically length of the cable between BLA08 and FM-29A is 900m.
- 5. Circuits feeding service lane lighting, cross girder lighting and girder lighting. The circuits are feed from switchboard BNC81.

2.5.1 Network components

Electrical characteristics of all components used for the Neplan calculations are listed for in the tables below.

Feeders:

Transformers:

Generators:

Cables:

*Double length are used for the calculation to include return circuit.

2.6 Load flow study

The objective of load flow study is to verify that the voltage will be kept within the guidelines of CEI 64\8. The design will aim to have a voltage variation from nominal (100%) limited to 4% at medium voltage level, 5% for lighting circuits, and 4% on other systems.

The load flow study is performed as a system study where voltage variations in the MV system are transferred to the LV system. The system study allow for analysing how voltage variations in the 6kV or 20kV distribution network affect the LV circuits.

It must be noted that it can not directly be evaluated whether the voltage design criteria are fulfilled on basis of the system study because the system study includes variation of the supply voltages. To evaluate whether the voltage design criteria are fulfilled the voltage drop (ΔU) of the low voltage

network must be limited to 4% for lighting circuits, and 5% for other systems. The voltage drop (ΔU) of the MV network must be limited to 4%.

2.6.1 Calculation of maximum voltage

Calculation of the maximum voltage is performed for operation scenario 1. The following forms a basis for the calculations:

- The voltage of the ENEL power supply at QMT-SS-Sicily and QMT-SS-Calabria is assumed to be 101% of nominal voltage.
- All transforms are loaded by 5% of their rated size. The UPS units are loaded by 0% of rated size.
- The feed in voltage of the UPS is assumed to be 101% of nominal voltage.

Calculated voltages at all nodes are presented in the tables below.

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The maximum voltage at 6kV is determined to 103.4% of nominal voltage. At Low voltage level the largest voltage for the lighting circuits are 103% of nominal voltage and for other circuits the largest voltage are 105,7% of nominal voltage.

The maximum voltage increase (ΔU) for the MW and LV network is less than zero thus the voltage at all nodes is within the range of the design criteria.

Neplan calculation sheets are shown in Appendix A.

2.6.2 Calculation of minimum voltage

The minimum voltage is determined for the operation scenario 1, 2 and 3.

Operation scenario 1

For operation scenario 1 (normal coupling configuration) the following operation conditions forms a basis for the calculations:

- The voltage of the ENEL power supply at QMT-SS-Sicily and QMT-SS-Calabria is assumed to be 99% of nominal voltage.
- The feed in voltage of the UPS units are assumed to be 99% of nominal voltage.
- Maximum load demand according to the load study including a spare capacity of 20%.

Calculated voltages at all nodes are presented in the tables below.

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The calculation of the minimum voltage for the operation scenario 1 verifies that the voltage can be maintained within the range of the design criteria. The minimum voltage is determined to 95% and ΔU=4% (since the UPS supply voltage is 99%) of the nominal voltage for the emergency lighting circuits supplied by UPS.

Neplan calculation sheets are shown in Appendix B.

Operation scenario 2

For operation scenario 2 (ENEL power supply from the Sicilian side only) the following operation conditions forms a basis for the calculations:

- The voltage of the ENEL power supply at QMT-SS-Sicily and QMT-SS-Calabria is assumed to be 100% of nominal voltage.
- Maximum load demand according to the load study including a spare capacity of 20%.

Calculated voltages at all nodes are presented in the table below. Results for the network feed by the UPS systems are not shown since the calculation is similar to the calculation of the minimum voltage of operation scenario 1.

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The minimum voltage calculated for operation scenario 1 verifies that the voltage can be maintained within the range of the design criteria. The minimum voltage at 6kV is 97% of nominal voltage. At Low voltage level the minimum voltage for the lighting circuits and other circuits are 95% of the nominal voltage. The minimum voltage drop of the LV network is ΔU=2%.

The Neplan calculation sheets are shown in section 2.8 and Appendix C. Information about current flow and power consumption is available form the sheets.

Operation scenario 3

For the operation scenario 3 with generators feeding the network the following operation conditions forms a basis for the calculations:

- The feed in voltage from the generators are 100% of nominal voltage.
- Maximum load demand according to the load study including a spare capacity of 20%.

Calculated voltages at all nodes are presented in the table below. Results for the network feed by the UPS systems are not shown since the calculation is similar to the calculation of the minimum voltage of operation scenario 3.

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The minimum voltage calculation verifies that the voltage can be maintained within the range of the design criteria for operation scenario 3.

Neplan calculation sheets are shown in Appendix D.

2.6.3 Voltage drop at motor start

Motors are used for dehumidification, fire fighting, pumping and drainage systems. When a motor is starting up it need more current than during continuous operation. This temporary large current stresses the electricity network and results in voltage drop.

The voltage drop at start up has been calculated for two different motor start-up scenarios. A scenario with two 74kW motors located in the pump and drainage house and one scenario with a 60kW motor used in a dehumidification unit on the bridge deck. At start up cosphi is set to 0.35. The motor on the bridge deck is located at the maximum distance from a substation.

The calculation is performed for a coupling configuration similar to operation scenario 1. Moreover the following forms a basis for the calculations:

- The voltage of the ENEL power supply at QMT-SS-Sicily and QMT-SS-Calabria is assumed to be 99% of nominal voltage.
- Maximum load demand according to the load study including a spare capacity of 20%.

Results of Neplan calculations are shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Figure 6 shows motors in the pump and drainage house and Figure 7 shows the motor on the bridge deck. The voltages at the motors are 95.9% and 91.2% of the nominal voltages. A voltage drop not more than 10% at motor start is acceptable.

In appendix E the entire Neplan calculation is shown.

Figure 6 – Neplan calculation sheet of motor in pump and drainage house.

Figure 7 - Neplan calculation sheet of motor on bridge deck.

2.7 Short circuit study

Fault current that flows as a result of short-circuit is calculated for three phase and phase-to-earth fault conditions. The calculations are in accordance with CEI/EN/IEC 60909

The short circuit study shall verify that the short circuit currents are within acceptable values that ensure that the power supply system can be build of standard equipment.

2.7.1 Calculation of maximum short circuit

Maximum short circuit calculations are performed for operation scenario 1. The following operation conditions forms a basis for the calculation:

- Ik["]max. at QMT-SS-Sicilia and QMT-SS-Calabria 31.5kA.
- Ik´´max feed by the UPS units are 4kA.
- Short circuit contributions from motors are not included in the calculations.

The maximum short circuit currents are presented in the tables below:

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The maximum short circuit level at both 6kV and 400V allows for installation of standard electrical equipment. The calculated short circuit levels are within the short circuit withstand capability of the MV and LV switchbords specified in the Design Specifications report no. CG1000- P2SDPITM4C3000000-06.

Neplan calculation sheets are shown in Appendix F.

2.7.2 Calculation of minimum short circuit

Calculation of the minimum short circuits is performed for operation scenario 2. The following operation conditions forms a basis for the calculations:

- Ik´´min at QMT-SS-Sicilia and QMT-SS-Calabria is 12.5kA.
- Ik´´min feed by the UPS units are 2kA.
- Contributions from motors are not included in the calculations.

The minimum short circuit currents are presented in the tables below:

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The minimum short circuit level at 6kV level is 1.5kA which is more than 5 times the maximum nominal current of the 6kV network thus short circuits can easily be detected and the network protected.

The smallest short circuit current in the low voltage network is found at the end of the emergency light circuit feed by the UPS system. The short circuit current is calculated to 70A which can be detected and beaked by a 10A breaker (tripping curve L, $6 \times I_n$).

Neplan calculation sheets are shown in Appendix G.

2.8 Calculation sheets

Neplan calculation sheets of the minimum voltage calculation are shown on the following pages. The calculation is performed for the operation scenario 2.

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3 Fire fighting system

3.1 Introduction

Current section presents the results from hydraulic simulations of the fire-fighting systems in the tower (high beam and low beam) and on the bridge.

The simulations cover both *steady-state* and transient simulations. The steady-state simulations are intended to suggest pipe dimensions and verify the characteristics of the selected pumps.

The objective of the *transient* analyses is to reveal any possible hydraulic problems in the firefighting system. This includes e.g. pump trip, start of pumps, opening and closing of valves.

The software used for the hydraulic calculations is Aquis version 1.50 from 7T (www.7t.dk).

3.2 Conclusion

The current document presents simulation results for the three hydraulically separated networks in the fire-fighting system for the Messina Strait Bridge. Four types of scenarios have been analysed for each network: steady-state, pump trip, valve closing and pump start.

The following subsections include a summary of the conclusions made.

3.2.1 Bridge

- Suggested pipe dimension: DN150.
- Pipe pressure class: PN25.
- Suitable surge vessel volume: 1 m^3 . Operation in start/stop mode at low flow may change the size of the surge vessel, see comments in section 3.3.1.
- Vacuum breakers should be installed on the middle of the bridge (at the highest elevation).
- Design flow: 2000 l/min.
- Required pump head at design flow: 18.9 bar.

3.2.2 Tower - High Beam

- Suggested pipe dimension: DN80.
- Pipe pressure class: PN63.
- Suitable surge vessel volume: 0.1 m^3 . Operation in start/stop mode at low flow may change the size of the surge vessel, see comments in section 3.3.1.
- Vacuum breakers should be installed at the highest elevation.
- Design flow: 300 l/min.
- Required pump head at design flow: 44.2 bar.

3.2.3 Tower - Low Beam

- Suggested pipe dimension: DN80.
- Pipe pressure class: Depends on pump selection.
	- Current pump selection: PN40 in elevation from 0 to ~50 metres (bridge elevation), PN25 is sufficient above 50 metres.
	- Pressure rating can be reduced to PN25 in case pumps with reduced head can be applied.
- Suitable surge vessel volume: 0.1 m^3 . Operation in start/stop mode at low flow may change the size of the surge vessel, see comments in section 3.3.1.
- Vacuum breakers should be installed at the highest elevation.
- Design flow: 300 l/min.
- Required pump head at design flow: 19.0 bar.

3.3 Assumptions

- Young's modulus for steel pipes is assumed to be $2.05 \cdot 10^5$ N/mm².
- Young's modulus for fibre filament wound epoxy pipes, according to Wavistrong engineering guide (ω =63°), is assumed to be 24515 N/mm².
- Bridge: Pipes used are glass fibre reinforced epoxy (GRE) pipes with spigot and socket end.

- High tower: Pipes used are steel pipes.
- Lower tower: Pipes used are steel pipes.
- The maximum acceptable pressure in transient analyses is the maximum operating pressure in accordance to the pressure class, multiplied by 1.5. This is under the assumption that pipes and components are subject to a test pressure at 1.5 x design pressure.
- The minimum acceptable pressure in the transient analyses is 0 bar(g).
- Operational parameters are as shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Operation parameters

• Pipe type catalogue used is as shown in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. See attachments D and E.

Table 3.3 Pipe type catalogue for GRE pipes.

- Polytrophic exponent for air in surge vessels is assumed to be $n = 1.3$ ($p_1V_1^n = p_2V_2^n$).
- Bridge, one of two parallel supply pipes across the bridge is in operation, the other is assumed to be closed.
- Towers (high and low), one of two parallel supply pipes in the tower is in operation, the other is assumed to be closed.
- Water level in supply tanks is assumed to be 1-4 metre above elevation of pumps. This implies that pressure upstream fire pumps is 0.1-0.4 bar(g).
- Bridge fire pump is KSB Multitec A 100/ 3-7.1 10.67. Pump curve is attached in attachment A.
- Tower high fire pump is KSB Multitec A 50/ 13C-3.1 20.61. Pump curve is attached in attachment B.
- Tower low fire pump is KSB Multitec A 50/ 6C-3.1 20.61. Pump curve is attached in attachment C.
- The singular losses such as pipe fittings and non-return valves are not specifically included in the pressure loss calculations, but is assumed to be covered within the pressure safety margin of 0.5 bar.
- The maximum pressure losses in fire hydrant is 1.5 bar, see attachment F.

The operating pressure range of fire hydrants is not discussed in the current memo. The hydrants should deliver water at constant pressure to the fire hoses, but is subjected to varying pressure range. It is suggested that this issue will be investigated.

3.3.1 Note on start/stop operation of pumps

The start and stop operation of the pumps has not been analysed in the current memo. This matter is of importance and is related to the operational parameters of the pumps, e.g. a well defined stop/start strategy is defined and is suitable for all load cases, e.g. low load cases.

The concern is to define start/stop pressure range of both the jockey pumps and fire pumps. Too many start/stop of the pumps can result in overheating of the pump motor.

Investigation of this issue is relevant in the discussion of surge vessel volume and motor selection. It is suggested that this analyse will be performed and documented.

3.4 Conceptual Layout

3.4.1 Network Layout

The network layout is as indicated in document "CG1000-P1L-DP-IT-M2-DI-00-00-00-01A", see attachment H.

Elevation op pipes (metres above mean sea level):

3.4.2 Pressure profile and hydraulic model

Figure 3-1and Figure 3-2 present the pressure profiles and hydraulic model of the fire fighting system.

Under normal operation situation both DN150 pipes are in service and water is supplied from one

pump station, on either Sicilia or Calabria end of the bridge.

In case one DN150 pipe is out of service, water can not be supplied from one pump station. In this case both pump stations are in operation.

Figure 3-1 Pressure profile and hydraulic model, 2 DN150 in service, 1 pump station in operation

Figure 3-2 Pressure profile and hydraulic model, 1 DN150 in service, 2 pump stations in operation

3.5 Scenario Enume eration

The model scenarios have a number indicated by X.Y.Z. The numbering system is as follows:

- X: A Bridge, B: High Beam, C: Low Beam
- Y: 1 Pump trip, 2 Valves Closing, 3 Pump start
- Z: Model variants and sensitivity analysis, non-consistent numbering, explanation showed in header of result graphs. 1 - This is the reference scenario with operational parameters and network layout as described in Sections 3.3 and 3.4.

3.6 Results, Bridge

3.6.1 Steady State

The required mass flow is 2000 l/min, which is to be delivered at minimum 8.9 bar(g) upstream the fire hydrants arrangement.

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Figure 3-3 Bridge Pump curve and system characteristics.

Figure 3-3 illustrates the pump and system characteristics. A larger format can be viewed in attachment A. The assumption for this diagram is water is supplied from one pump station only.

At first the supply criteria was water supply of 2000 l/min from one pump station and at minimum pressure of 8.9 bar(g) upstream fire hydrants and one parallel pipe on the bridge in service.

It has now been accepted through risk assessment, that in case one parallel pipe on the bridge is out of service the second pump station (on the opposite end of the bridge) will be taken into operation.

A pipe dimension of DN150 is sufficient in both cases. With DN150 and 2 pipes in service, 1 pump station in operation, the required pump head is 17.25 bar and the delivered pump head is 19.4 bar. With 1 pipe in service and 2 pump station in operation the required pump head is 18.11 bar and the delivered pump head is 22.79 bar.

The pump head at zero flow is 23.9 bar. The pressure class should minimum be the maximum observed pressure under normal operation. The recommended pressure class is PN25.

The simulations have been performed with the assumed lowest possible water level in the supply tanks, 1 metre above the pump elevation. When the tanks are full the pressure at zero flow is higher than 23.9 bar(g).

The minimum pressure at 2000 l/min is 10.1 bar(g) and 13.6 bar(g) for 2 and 1 pipes in service, respectively.

3.6.2 Transient

3.6.2.1 Pump Trip

The system is initially in full operation, the water flow is 2000 l/min, and the pumps are at full speed. At time t=10 seconds, the fire pump trips.

Figure 3-4 presents the simulation results for Scenario A.1.3. This scenario presents the system under normal operation with 2 DN150 pipes in service and one pump station in operation. The 2 remotest fire hydrants are open.

The system is equipped with vacuum breaker at the highest elevation (middle of the bridge). There are no surge vessels nor surge relief valves included.

The results show an instantaneous pressure drop downstream the fire pump. The pressure wave reaches the open fire hydrants after 5 seconds.

The results indicate that the vacuum breaker is activated at time t=21 second, at the moment when the pressure at the middle of the bridge drops to 0 bar(g). The pressure at this location remains 0 bar(g), indicating that the vacuum breaker remains activated throughout the simulation period.

The introduction of vacuum breaker has the consequence that air will be sucked into the system at pump stop. The system must be furnished with (automatic) vents to ensure that air is vented.

Scenario A.1.3 is acceptable from a hydraulic point of view.

Scenario A.1.4 corresponds to scenario A.1.3 but now with one DN150 pipe in service and water is supplied from both pump stations. The 2 remotes hydrants are open. In this case the 2 remotest hydrants are on the middle of the bridge.

The results indicate that the vacuum breaker is activated at time t=19 seconds, at the moment when the pressure at the middle of the bridge drops to 0 bar(g). The pressure at this location remains 0 bar(g), indicating that the vacuum breaker remains activated throughout the simulation period.

Scenario A.1.4 is acceptable from a hydraulic point of view.

3.6.2.2 Valves Closing

The system is initially in full operation, the water flow is 2000 l/min, and the pumps are at full speed. At time t=10 seconds, the fire hydrants are closed simultaneously. To illustrate the worstcase scenario with regard to closing of the fire hydrants, a short closing time is chosen. The closing time of the hydrants is 0.1 secon d.

Figure 3-6 presents the simulation results for Scenario A.2.2. This scenario presents the system under normal operation with 2 DN150 pipes in service and one pump station in operation. The 2 remotest fire hydrants are open.

The results show a sudden rise in pressure at the fire hydrant at the time when the hydrants are closed. The maximum observed pressure is 30 bar(g) downstream the fire pump. The minimum observed pressure is 0.1 bar(g) upstream the fire pump.

Scenario A.2.2 is acceptable from a hydraulic point of view.

Scenario A.2.3 corresponds to scenario A.2.2 but now with one DN150 pipe in service and water is supplied from both pump stations. The 2 remotes hydrants are open. In this case the 2 remotest hydrants are on the middle of the bridge. Simulation results for scenario A.2.3 are presented in Figure 3-7.

The maximum observed pressure is 25 bar(g) downstream the fire pump. The minimum observed pressure is 0.1 bar(g) upstream the fire pump.

Scenario A.2.3 is acceptable from a hydraulic point of view.

3.6.2.3 Pump Start

The system is initially in standby mode. At time t=10 seconds, the fire pump is started. The initial pressure conditions correspond to a minimum pressure of 8.9 bar(g) in the system (at the highest location, middle of the bridge).

The initial pump speed of the fire pump is 2442 rpm, to maintain the above mentioned 8.9 bar(g) at the middle of the bridge. This model configuration is equivalent to a scenario where the jockey pump is initially in operation to maintain a minimum pressure of 8.9 bar(g), and then the fire pump is started when the pressure drops (due to open hydrants).

At time t=10 seconds. two fire hydrants are opened. The opening time is assumed to be 0.1 second. At the same moment (t=10 seconds), the fire pump is started. The ramp-up time of the fire pump is assumed to be 0.1 seco nds.

Figure 3-8 presents the simulation results for Scenario A.3.6. This scenario presents the system under normal operation with 2 DN150 pipes in service and one pump station in operation. The 2 remotest fire hydrants are open. The system includes one surge vessel, installed downstream fire pump with total water volume of 1 m³. The initial air volume is 0.2 m³.

The maximum observed pressure is 22 bar(g) and the minimum pressure is 0.1 bar(g). Scenario

A.3.6 is acceptable from hydraulic point of view.

Scenario A.3.7 corresponds to scenario A.3.6 but now with one DN150 pipe in service and water is supplied from both pump stations. The 2 remotes hydrants are open. In this case the 2 remotest hydrants are on the middle of the bridge. The system includes one surge vessel in each pump station, installed downstream the fire pump with total water volume of 1 $m³$ each. The initial air volume is 0.2 m^3 . Simulation results for scenario A.3.7 are presented in Figure 3-9.

The maximum observed pressure is 21.5 bar(g) and the minimum pressure is 0.1 bar(g). Scenario A.3.6 is acceptable from a hydraulic point of view.

The volume of the surge vessel is 1.0 m^3 . Sensitivity analyses indicate that this is a suitable volume for the surge vessel. A larger surge vessel will result in smoother pressure development but only by a small margin compared to the surge vessel volume.

70.0

80.0

Time

 100.0 ^{rs]}

 90.0

With regards to the suitable size of the surge vessel, please note the comments in section 3.3.1.

3.7 Results, Tower - High Beam

Figure 3-9 Scenario A.3.7 Pressure development as a function of time.

40.0

50.0

60.0

3.7.1 Steady state

10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 2.00 0.00

 -2.00

 0.0

10.0

20.0

 30.0

The required water flow is 300 l/min, which is to be delivered at minimum 6.0 bar(g).

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Figure 3-10 Tower High, Pump curve and system characteristics.

Figure 3-10 illustrates the pump curve and system characteristics. A larger format can be viewed in attachment B. The figure reveals marginal difference between DN80 and DN100 in required pump head. The selected pipe dimension is DN80.

At flow rate 300 l/min and with pipe dimension DN80 the necessary pump head is 44.2 bar, and the maximum velocity is 0.94 m/s. The necessary pump head is defined as the pump head required to maintain the pressure at minimum 6.0 bar(g) at all locations in the network.

The delivered pump head at flow 300 l/min is 49.6 bar. The reason for this is that the pumps are not speed regulated. The minimum pressure in the system is 11.5 bar(g) upstream the open fire

hydrant.

The maximum pressure upstream fire hydrants at design flow is 24.6 bar(g) .

The pump head at zero flow is 59.6 bar. The pressure class should minimum be the maximum observed pressure under normal operation. The recommended pressure class is therefore PN63.

3.7.2 Transient

3.7.2.1 Pump Trip

The system is initially in full operation, the water flow is 300 l/min, and the pumps are at full speed, 2950 rpm. At time t=10 seconds, the fire pump trips.

Figure 3-11, Figure 3-12 and Figure 3-13 present the simulation results for scenario B.1.1. This is the reference scenario. The reference scenario does not include surge vessel, vacuum breakers or surge relief valves.

The results show an instantaneous pressure drop downstream the fire pump. The pressure drops from 50 bar(g) down to around 38 bar(g). Pressure of 38 bar(g) corresponds to the elevation difference between the fire pump and the hydrant. It is assumed that no backflow is allowed in the fire pump, this is illustrated in Figure 3-13.

The maximum observed pressure is 49.7 bar(g) downstream the fire pump. The minimum pressure is -0.2 bar(g).

Figure 3-12 is a close-up look of the pressure development at the fire hydrant. The figure illustrates a negative pressure of -0.2 bar(g). There is a spike in the pressure graph down to -0.4 bar(g), which is considered to be simulation noise and therefore is disregarded.

The simulation results depend strongly on the backflow assumption. It is assumed that no backflow is allowed, not through the fire pump or e.g. a non-return valve. In case of any backflow at the fire pump, the pressure at the fire hydrant will be lower than simulated.

Scenario B.1.1 is not acceptable from a hydraulic point of view.

Figure 3-13 Scenario B.1.1 Flow d evelopment as a function of time.

In scenario B.1.2, a vacuum breaker has been inserted at the highest elevation near the fire hydrant (and at same elevation as the fire hydrant). The simulation results are presented in Figure 3-14 and Figure 3-15. It is assumed that the size and capacity of the vacuum breaker are sufficient.

The results indicate that the vacuum breaker is activated at time t=11.3 seconds, when the pressure at the fire hydrant drops to 0 bar(g). The pressure at this location remains 0 bar(g), indicating that the vacuum breaker remains activated throughout the simulation period. The water flow drops from 300 l/min down to 0 l/min immediately after the pump trip.

The maximum observed pressure is 49.7 bar(g) downstream the fire pump. The minimum pressure is 0 bar(g).

The presence of a vacuum breaker of sufficient size and capacity at the highest elevation in the system can solve the issue of pressure below 0 bar(g).

Scenario B.1.2 is acceptable from a hydraulic point of view.

3.7.2.2 Valves Closing

The system is initially in full operation, the water flow is 300 l/min, and the pump is at full speed, 2950 rpm. At time t=10 seconds, the fire hydrant is closed. To illustrate the worst-case scenario with regard to closing of the fire hydrant, a short closing time is chosen. The closing time of the hydrant is 0.1 second.

Figure 3-16 and Figure 3-17 present the simulation results for scenario B.2.1. This is the reference scenario. The reference scenario does not include any surge vessel, vacuum breakers or surge relief valves.

The results show are sudden rise in pressure at the fire hydrant at the time when the hydrant is closed. The maximum observed pressure is 65 bar(g) downstream the fire pump. The minimum observed pressure is 0 bar(g) upstream the fire pump.

Scenario B.2.1 is acceptable from a hydraulic point of view.

3.7.2.3 Pump Start

1.00

The system is initially in standby mode, and then the fire pump is started. The initial pressure conditions correspond to at minimum pressure of 6.0 bar(g) in the system at the highest location (383 metres), upstream the hydrant).

Time

The initial pump speed of the fire pump is 2404 rpm, to maintain the above mentioned 6.0 bar(g) upstream the hydrant. This model configuration is equivalent to a scenario where the jockey pump is initially in operation to maintain a minimum pressure of 6.0 bar(g), and the fire pump is started when the pressure drops (due to an open hydrant).

The reference scenario B.3.1 does not include a surge vessel.

The other presented scenario B.3.4 includes a surge vessel with a volume of 0.1 m³. The initial air volume at pressure 42 bar(g) is 0.02 m^3 .

Figure 3-18 presents the simulation results for Scenario B.3.1. This scenario is the reference scenario, with no surge vessel installed.

The system is in standby-mode from time t=0 to t=10 seconds. In standby-mode, the minimum pressure in the system is maintained at 6.0 bar(g) $(4.0 \text{ bar(g)} + 0.5 \text{ bar in safety} + 1.5 \text{ in pressure})$ drop in fire hydrant). The minimum pressure is upstream the fire hydrant at the highest elevation.

At time t=10 seconds, the fire hydrant is opened. The opening time is assumed to be within 1 second. At the same moment (t=10 seconds), the fire pump is started. The ramp-up time of the pump is assumed to be 0.1 seco nds.

The results show that the resulting pressure in the system has a maximum of 54 bar(g) downstream the fire pump and minimum of 1.5 bar(g) upstream the fire hydrant. The pressure development is very rapid, almost instantaneous.

Figure 3-19 presents the simulation result for scenario B.3.4. This scenario corresponds to the reference scenario, but with surge vessel installed downstream the fire pump.

The resulting maximum and minimum pressure are 50 bar(g) and 1.5 bar(g) and the pressure development is more smooth compared to scenario B.3.1. The volume of the surge vessel is 0.1 $m³$. Sensitivity analyses indicate that this is a suitable volume for the surge vessel. A larger surge

vessel will result in smoother pressure development, but only by a small margin compared to the surge vessel volume.

Please note comments in section 3.3.1 on start/stop operation.

3.8 Results, Tower - Low Beam

3.8.1 Steady state

The required water flow is 300 l/min, which is to be delivered at minimum 6.0 bar(g).

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Figure 3-20 illustrates the pump curve and system characteristics. A larger format can be viewed in attachment C. The figure reveals marginal difference between DN80 and DN100 in required pump head. The selected pipe dimension is DN80.

At flow rate 300 l/min and with pipe dimension DN80, the necessary pump head is 19.0 bar, and the maximum velocity is 0.94 m/s. The necessary pump head is defined as the pump head required to maintain the pressure at minimum 6.0 bar(g) at all locations in the network.

The delivered pump head at flow 300 l/min is 21.7 bar. The reason for this is that the pumps are not speed regulated. The minimum pressure in the system is 8.7 bar(g) upstream the open fire hydrant, which is 2.7 bar above the requirements.

The maximum pressure upstream fire hydrants at design flow is 8.7 bar(g).

The pump head at zero flow is 25.9 bar. The pressure class should minimum be the maximum observed pressure under normal operation. For this reason, the recommended pressure class is PN40.

The simulations have been performed with the assumed lowest possible water level in the supply tanks, 1 metre above the pump elevation. When the tanks are full the pressure at zero flow is higher than 25.9 bar(g). If the water level in the tanks is, e.g. 5 metres above the pump level the resulting maximum pressure in the system is 26.4 bar(g).

The pump curve can be adjusted so that the fire pump does not exceed the 25 bar(g) limit and maintain a minimum 6.0 bar(g). The delivered pump head at zero flow should be lowered by 1.4 bar from 26.4 bar to 25, but the pump should be able to deliver a pump head of 19 bar at flow rate of 300 l/min. The maximum water level of the supply tanks should also be taken into consideration in this matter. If this is done then the suggested pressure class can be brought down to PN25.

Another solution could be to construct the pipe section from pump to bridge elevation in a pressure class PN40 and the rest of the system in PN25.

3.8.2 Transient

3.8.2.1 Pump Trip

The system is initially in full operation, the water flow is 300 l/min, and the pumps are at full speed, 2950 rpm. At time t=10 seconds, the fire pump trips.

Figure 3-21, Figure 3-22 and Figure 3-23 present the simulation results for Scenario C.1.1. This is the reference scenario. The reference scenario does not include surge vessel, vacuum breakers or surge relief valves.

The results show an instantaneous pressure drop downstream the fire pump. The pressure drops from 21.7 bar(g) down to around 13 bar(g), which corresponds to the elevation difference between the fire pump and the hydrant. It is assumed that fire pump allows no backflow, this is illustrated in Figure 3-23.

Figure 3-22 is a close-up look of the pressure development at the fire hydrant. The figure illustrates a negative pressure of -0.2 bar(g).

The simulation results depend strongly on the backflow assumption. It is assumed that no backflow is allowed, not through the fire pump or e.g. a non-return valve. In case of any backflow at the fire pump, the pressure at the fire hydrant will be lower than simulated.

The maximum observed pressure is 21.7 bar(g) downstream the fire pump. The minimum observed pressure is -0.2 bar(g) upstream the fire hydrant.

Scenario C.1.1 is not acceptable from a hydraulic point of view.

Figure 3-23 Scenario C.1.1 Flow d evelopment as a function of time.

In Scenario C.1.2, a vacuum breaker has been inserted at the highest elevation near the fire hydrant (and at same elevation as the fire hydrant). The simulation results are presented in Figure 3-24 and Figure 3-25. It is assumed that the size and capacity of the vacuum breaker is sufficient.

The results indicate that the vacuum breaker is activated at time t=11 seconds, when the pressure at the fire hydrant drops to 0 bar(g). The pressure at this location remains 0 bar(g), indicating that the vacuum breaker remains activated. The water flow drops from 300 l/min down to 0 l/min immediately after the pump trip.

The presence of a vacuum breaker of sufficient size and capacity at the highest elevation in the system can solve the issue of pressure below 0 bar(g).

The maximum observed pressure is 21.7 bar(g) downstream the fire pump. The minimum observed pressure is 0 bar(g) upstream the fire hydrant.

Scenario C.1.2 is acceptable from a hydraulic point of view.

3.8.2.2 Valves Closing

The system is initially in full operation, the water flow is 300 l/min, and the pumps are at full speed, 2950 rpm. At time t=10 seconds, the fire hydrant is closed. To illustrate the worst-case scenario with regard to closing of fire hydrant, a short closing time is chosen. The closing time of the hydrant is 0.1 seconds.

Figure 3-26 and Figure 3-27 present the simulation results for Scenario C.2.1. This is the reference scenario. The reference scenario does not include any surge vessel, vacuum breakers or surge relief valves.

The results show a sudden rise in pressure upstream the fire hydrant at the time when the hydrant is closed. The maximum observed pressure is 34 bar(g) downstream the fire pump. The minimum observed pressure is 0 bar(g) upstream the fire pump.

Scenario C.2.1 is acceptable from a hydraulic point of view.

3.8.2.3 Pump Start

The system is initially in standby mode, and then the fire pumps are started. The initial pressure conditions correspond to at minimum pressure of 6.0 bar(g) in the system at the highest location (130 metres), upstream the hydrant.

The initial pump speed of the fire pump is 2385 rpm, to maintain the above mentioned 6.0 bar(g) upstream the hydrant. This model configuration is equivalent to a scenario where the jockey pumps are initially in operation to maintain a minimum pressure of 6.0 bar(g), and then fire pump is started when the pressure begins to drop (due to the open hydrant).

The reference Scenario C.3.1 does not include a surge vessel.

The other presented scenario, C.3.3, includes a surge vessel with a volume of 0.1 m^3 . The initial air volume at pressure 17.3 bar(g) is 0.02 m³.

Figure 3-28 presents the simulation results for Scenario C.3.1. This scenario is the reference scenario, with no surge vessel installed.

The system is in standby-mode from time t=0 to t=10 seconds. In standby-mode, the minimum pressure in the system is maintained at 6.0 bar(g) $(4.0 \text{ bar}(\text{g}) + 0.5 \text{ bar})$ in safety + 1.5 bar in pressure drop in fire hydrant). The minimum pressure is upstream the fire hydrant at the highest

elevation.

At time t=10 seconds, the fire hydrant is opened. The opening time is assumed to be within 1 second. At the same moment (t=10 seconds), the fire pump is started. The ramp-up time of the fire pump is assumed to be 0.1 seco nds.

The results show that the resulting pressure in the system has a maximum of 24 bar(g) downstream the fire pump and minimum of 2 bar(g) upstream the fire hydrant. The pressure development is very rapid, almost instantaneous.

Figure 3-29 presents the simulation result for scenario C.3.3. This scenario corresponds to the reference scenario, but with are surge vessel installed downstream the fire pump.

The resulting maximum pressure is 22 bar(g) and the minimum pressure is 2 bar(g). The pressure development is more smooth compared to scenario C.3.1. The volume of the surge vessel is 0.1 $m³$. From sensitivity analysis it has been concluded that this is a suitable volume for the surge vessel. A larger surge vessel will result in smoother pressure development but only by a small margin compared to the surge vessel volume.

3.9 Miscellaneous

3.9.1 Bridge pump curve

3.9.2 Tower High pump

3.9.3 Tower Low pumps

3.9.4 Logstor Pipe Type Catalogue

3.9.5 Wavistrong Pipe Ty ype Catalogue

3.9.6 Fire hydrant characteristics

3.9.7 Surge vessel calculations

Bridge:

Tower High:

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Tower Low:

3.9.8 Applied equations for pressure drop calculation

The software (Aquis) applied for analyses of the hydraulics in the fire fighting system offers the option to calculate the frictional pressure drop based on two alternative sets of equations i.e. a calculation of frictional pressure drop by calculation of a friction factor (f) by application of Colebrook-White equations or calculation of frictional pressure drop based on Hazen-Williams equations and a specification of a roughness coefficient (C).

Pressure drop is calculated according to Colebrook-White equations as

 $dp = (2 \cdot rho \cdot f \cdot v^2)/D$ [Pa/m],

where rho is the fluid density [kg/m3], f is the friction factor, v is the velocity [m/s] and D is the pipes inside diameter [m].

For Reynolds number (Re) smaller than 2300 the friction factor f is calculated as:

 $f = 16/Re$

and for large Reynolds numbers as:

 $1/\sqrt{(f)} = -4 \cdot \log_{10}[k/(3.7 \cdot D) + 1.413/(Re \cdot \sqrt{(f)})]$

k is the pipe roughness [m]

The Hazen-Williams equation is as follows:

 $dp = 1.1101 \cdot 10^{10} \cdot (Q/C)^{1.85} \cdot 1/D^{4.8655}$ [kPa/m]

where Q is the volumetric flow [m3/h], D is the pipes inside diameter [mm] and C is the roughness coefficient.

In the hydraulic analyses that have been carried out, the frictional pressure loss in the pipes has been calculated based on Colebrook-White set of equations (C-W).

The equations based on C-W provides the best estimate of the frictional loss (compared to the frictional pressure loss experienced in the actual system) and that the C-W equations are applicable in a much wider range.

As mentioned above another set of equations that can be used are the Hazen-Williams (H-W) equations.

The reason for applying H-W and not C-W is that the determination of the friction factor (f) in C-W

equation can not be made explicitly. In case the H-W equation is used a roughness coefficient (C) has to be applied based on experiences and indications in the literature.

Determining the friction factor in the C-W equation requires iteration. An iterative calculation procedure does not represent any difficulties when using state of the art software and suitable hardware and can be calculated with great accuracy.

The C-W pipe roughness (k) applied in the analyses is 0.1 mm. To obtain identical frictional pressure drop by the H-W method a roughness coefficient (C) of 133 shall be applied. Using these values identical frictional pressure losses are calculated with the two alternative sets of equations.

The literature indicates a typical interval for the H-W roughness coefficient (C) of 130-150 for the type of pipes and pipe dimensions in question for the fire fighting system on the Messina Strait Bridge.

Applying a roughness coefficient (C) of 133 and using the H-W equations provides identical frictional pressure drops as the pressure drops calculated in the present report by application of pipe roughness (k) of 0.1 mm and using the C-W equations. It is noted that the H-W roughness coefficient (C) of 133 is within the interval indicated in the literature.

3.10 Utility Water System

3.10.1 Calculation of utility water pumps

There are different pumps for utility water supply to the towers and to the bridge girder.

3.10.2 Supply to the towers :

4 bar.

Pipe material is Stainless steel.

3.10.2.1 Pumps for low level: (up to level 130 m)

Static pressure = 130m - 5 m = 125 mWc = 12.5 bar.

Outlet pressure = min.

Pressure at valves = 4 bar.

Pressure loss = appr. 250 m¹⁾ φ 50mm \Rightarrow 0.032 mWc/m x 205 m = 8 mWc = 0.8 bar.

Min. pump head = $12.5 + 4 + 0.8 = 17.3$ bar.

Pump requirement including safety margin : Flow = 150 l/min at head = 21 bar

3.10.2.2 Pumps for high level: (level 130 m to level 380 m)

Static pressure = 380m- 5 m = 375 mWc = 37.5 bar.

Pressure at valves = 4 bar.

Pressure loss = appr. 500 m¹⁾ \varnothing 50mm \Rightarrow 0.032 mWc/m x 500 m = 16 mWc = 1.6 bar.

Min pump head = $37.5 + 4 + 1.6 = 43.1$ bar.

Pump requirement including safety margin : Flow = 150 l/min at head = 45 bar

1) The length includes pipes and fittings inside the pump station and between pump station and tower.

3.10.3 Supply to bridge girder:

Valve specifications as for towers.

3.10.3.1 Evaluation of utility water main dimension

In order to keep the pressure range for the equipment on the gantry at PN10 the utility water main dimension DN65 has first been chosen.

It will be possible to reduce the pipe dimension to DN50. This will cause a higher pump head and require a higher pressure range for the equipment on the gantry.

The rough calculations are stated in the following:

Design conditions:

Wash valve specifications:

 $Flow = 125$ $l/min = 7.5m3/h$.

Outlet pressure = min. 4 bar.

Level in the one end of the bridge = 55 meter.

Level in the middle of the bridge = 75meter.

Calculation of pressure variations at the wash valves at different positions with DN65 and DN50:

One pump station is supplying the half of the bridge length = 1625 meter.

The pipe material is GRE. See head loss flow chart from Wavistrong below

In the calculations the pump pressure PX is used.

DN65:

Pressure at valves in the ends of the bridge:

Pressure loss in 1625 m DN65: ΔP_{DNG5} = 0.008 mVs/m x 1625 m = 13 mVs = 1.3 bar.

 P_{end} = PX - 55/10 = PX - 5.5 bar

 $P_{middle} = PX - 75/10 - \Delta P_{DN65} = PX - 7.5 - 1.3 bar = PX - 8.8bar.$

Pressure variations at the wash valves = P_{end} - P_{middle} = -5.5 -(-8.8) bar = 3.3 bar

With pressure at valve = 4 bar the variation of the pressure will be from **4 bar** to 4+3.3 = **7.3 bar**

DN50:

Pressure at valves at the middle of the bridge:

Pressure loss in 1625 m DN50: ΔP_{DNG5} = 0.032 mVs/m x 1625 m = 52 mVs = 5.2 bar.

 P_{end} = PX 55/10 = PX - 5.5 bar

 $P_{\text{middle}} = PX - 75/10 - \Delta P_{\text{DN65}} = PX - 7.5 - 5.2$ bar = PX -12.7bar.

Pressure variations at the wash valves = P_{end} - P_{middle} = -5.5 -(-12.7) bar = 7.2 bar

With pressure at valve = 4 bar the variation of the pressure will be from **4 bar** to 4+7.2 = **11.2 bar**

Fig. II.B. Head loss flow chart ID 25 mm through 300 mm

 Head loss flow chart for GRE pipes

3.10.3.2 Evaluation of pump capacities

3.10.3.3 Pumps for bridge girder:

The water main dimension DN50 has been chosen and the pump requirements are as stated in item 2.2: Flow 125 l/min at head 17 bar.

Pump requirements including safety margin: Flow = 150 l/min at head = 17 bar.

3.11 Pipeline design

3.11.1 Purpose

This section is prepared in order to evaluate design and installation methods for utility water, fire fighting and drainage pipelines in GRE (Glass Fibre Reinforced Epoxy) depending on design conditions and constraints stipulated by the main bridge structure.

3.11.2 Conclusion

It is recommend using GRE pipelines due to several advantages in compare with other plastic, carbon steel and ductile iron pipeline materials:

- Lightweight saving pipeline material.
- High corrosion resistance.
- High pipe joint flexibility.
- Easy and fast installation methods.
- Reduced cost of installation compared to metals.
- Low health impact during installation.
- Fire resistance level 3, acc. to IMO Resolution A.753 can be achieved by fire barrier integrated in the outer surface (Wavistrong FR).
- Wavistrong FR has low flame spread, smoke and toxicity.
- Static electricity can be avoided by a conductive liner and a structural wall with integrated carbon fibres (Wavistrong CST).

The utility water, fire fighting and drainage pipelines are recommended to be designed and installed according to the following principles:

- The pipelines shall be established by using glass fibre reinforced epoxy (GRE) standard pipes in length of 7.5 m which are jointed by standard tensile resistant joints similar to epoxy standard tensile resistant pipes (EST) with rubber seal lock joints (RSLJ) and with adhesive bonded conical joints (CJ) for DN<80 from Future Pipe Industries (FPI).
- The drainage pipelines shall be supported and guided at each diaphragm (cc 3750 mm) in the bridge girders and intermediate anchor pipe supported (cc 30 m) in order to diminish pipeline movements at pipe branches and to assure the pipeline column stability.
- The fire pipelines shall be supported and guided at every second walkway bracket at railway bridge girder (cc 3750 mm) and intermediate anchor pipe supported (cc 30 m) in order to diminish pipeline movements at pipe branches and to assure the pipeline column stability.
- The utility water pipelines shall be supported and guided at every walkway bracket at railway bridge girder (cc 1875 mm) and intermediate anchor pipe supported (cc 30 m) in order to diminish pipeline movements at pipe branches and to assure the pipeline column stability.
- The RSLJ- joints for drainage and fire pipelines shall be capable of accommodating a certain amount of temperature expansion and to transfer the full pressure resultant in the elongated position.
- The CJ- joints for utility water pipelines shall be capable of transferring tension and compression forces due to pressure and temperature expansion with sufficient column stability.
- The pipe joints are not able to transfer the pressure resultant at temperature expansions where as the pipelines shall be installed with primary anchor supports at pipeline ends to the roadway and railway girders where pipelines are provided with loops at first terminal structure pier to the ground.
- At the ends of the bridge girders the pipelines shall be installed with primary anchor pipe supports which are capable of transferring the full design pressure resultant.
- The pipeline loops between bridge girders and terminal structures/piers shall be installed with angular expansion bellows in order to accumulate the large longitudinal (± 2000 mm; ULS) movements of the bridge girders to which pipelines are anchored.
- At the drop-in span interconnections the pipelines shall be installed with axial bellows in order to accumulate the large longitudinal bridge deck movements $(\pm 100 \text{ to } \pm 700 \text{ mm})$; ULS) and minor transverse movements (± 20 mm; ULS).

Implementing of the above described pipeline design principle has the following consequences for the design of the bridge girders:

- Minimum pipe whole diameter in the bridge girder diaphragms shall be 610 mm in roadway girders and 480 mm in railway girder.
- Minimum pipe whole diameter in bottom of girders at bridge ends shall be 610 mm in roadway girders and 480 mm in railway girder.
- Pipeline support design loadings acc. to principle layout drawings and 4.10.4 calculations.
- Intermediate anchor design loadings acc. to principle layout drawings and 4.10.4 calculations.
- Primary anchor design loadings acc. to principle layout drawings and 4.10.4 calculations.

3.11.3 Design basis

3.11.3.1 Design Lifetime

The design lifetime for the pipeline facilities will be minimum 50 years.

3.11.3.2 Principle process diagrams

The following drawings describe the principle process systems and typical layout for the drainage and fire fighting pipeline systems:

- Drainage system, Girders and towers, Principle diagram.
- Drainage system, Birders and towers, Principle plan and section layout.
- Utility water and fire fighting, Pumping station and distribution, Principle diagram.
- Utility water and fire fighting, Water main locations, Typical section in girders and towers.

3.11.3.3 Pipeline system description

DRAINAGE SYSTEM

The drainage pipelines with branches spaced every 15 m to gullies are installed inside the roadway and railway bridged girder and along the whole length of the suspended bridge i.e. approximately 3666 m, see drawings below. The pipelines pass the diaphragms which are stiffening the box girders within a spacing of 3750 mm.

The drainage pipeline varies in pipe diameter from DN200 at middle of bridge to DN300/400 at ends of the bridge where the pipeline is installed with pipe loops to the ground and connected to the reception chamber/sand trap. The branches to gullies are DN150 at roadway deck and DN100 at railway deck.

PIANTA (TIPO)

PLAN (TYP)

The drainage pipeline elements shall be installed with restrained joints along the bridge girders and stabilized by pipe supports. The probably most feasible jointing method for the main GRE pipeline elements is to use restrained joints like "Rubber Seal Lock Joints" (RSLJ) from Future Pipe Industries (FPI). This solution requires rest, guides and intermediate anchoring of the GRE pipeline along the bridge girders and can be placed at penetrations of the bridge box girder diaphragms cc 3750 mm. This support distance comply with the maximum pipe support distance of 3.6 - 5.6 m for the main drainage pipes (see pipeline calculations).

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with penetrations for pipelines.

The distance between the intermediate anchors depends mainly on the spacing of branches to gullies, length of main GRE pipeline elements and the maximum allowable movement in the couplings.

At bridge deck ends the GRE pipelines have to be anchored to the bridge deck in order to eliminate the relative movements between pipelines and bridge deck. The pipeline loop between bridge deck and the terminal structure shall be designed to withstand longitudinal bridge deck movements of maximum ± 2000 mm.

FIRE FIGHTING SYSTEM

The fire fighting pipeline DN150 with branches for fire hydrants DN65 spaced every 90 m is installed all along the outside edges of the railway bridge girder (below the walkway) as shown on

the bridge cross section and plan drawing below.

The pipelines shall be provided with rest and guide supports approximately cc 3750 mm on the RHS- profiles which is supporting the walkway at the edges of the railway bridge deck.

PONTE - SEZIONE TRASVERSALI A-A CROSS SECTION A-A **BRIDGE**

UTILITY WATER SYSTEM

The utility water pipeline DN50 with branches for service valves spaced every 90 m is installed all along one edge of the railway bridge girder (below the walkway) as shown on the bridge cross section and plan drawing.

The pipelines will be provided with rest and guide supports approximately cc 1875 mm on the RHS- profiles which is supporting the walkway at the edges of the railway bridge deck.

3.11.3.4 Codes and standards

- ISO 14692 Glass-reinforced plastics (GRP) piping.
- BS 7159 Design and construction of glass reinforced plastics (GRP) piping systems for individual plants or sites.
- WAVISTRONG Engineering Guide
- WAVISTRONG Product List (pipes & fittings)
- EN 1092 Part 1: Steel Flanges
- ANSI/ASME B31.3 Chemical plant and petroleum refinery piping
- ANSI/ASME B36.10 Dimensions of steel pipes
- ANSI/ASME B16.9 Steel butt welding fittings
- ANSI/ASME B16.5 Flanges

3.11.3.5 Procedures

Future Pipe Industries Engineering Guide

3.11.3.6 Computer programs

Piping stress analyses:

• TRIFLEX Windows version 3.3.1 developed by Piping Solutions Inc.

3.11.3.7 Symbols and indices

- E basic quality factor Y material/temperature factor Em modulus of elasticity S 0.2 % minimum specified tensile strength (SMYS) S_c basic allowable stress at minimum metal temperature S_h basic allowable stress at maximum metal temperature S_A allowable displacement stress range S_L longitudinal stress
- S_E displacement stress range

3.11.3.8 Geometry parameters

GRE PIPE AND FITTINGS:

3.11.3.9 Material characteristics

GRE MATERIALS (Ω=55º, EST SERIES) ACC. TO WAVISTRONG

Seq = 19.3 MPa; pressure + weight Seq = 24.5 MPa; pressure + weight + Q

Allowable stress curves for combined axial, hoop and shear are given in Wavistrong "Engineering Guide".

3.11.3.10 Operation and design loads

DEAD WEIGHT

GRE pipe density δ_{are} = 1850 kg/m³

PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE

Installation temperature $T_{inst} = 20 °C$

PIPE SUPPORTS RESTRAINTS

Coefficient of friction $\mu_{ss} = 0.3$ (steel on steel) $\mu_{tt} = 0.1$ (steel on PTFE)

BRIDGE GIRDER MOVEMENTS

The bridge girder is able to move at both ends where expansion elements are located. The maximum bridge girder movements are:

 dL_{Long} = \pm 2000 mm; ULS (Ultimate Limit State)

 $dL_{Trans} = ± 0$ mm; ULS

The maximum relative bridge girder movements at drop-in span at towers are:

 $dL_{Long} = \pm 100 - \pm 800$ mm; ULS

 $dL_{Trans} = ± 20$ mm; ULS

BRIDGE DECK SLOPES

The design slope towards Calabria is 0.85 %.

The design slope towards Sicily is 1.5 %.

3.11.3.11 Environmental loads

AMBIENT AIR TEMPERATURES

Max. air temperature $T_{A max} = +43 \degree C$

Sun radiation increase T_{rad} = 10 °C; average value for un-insulated lines

WIND LOAD

EARTHQUAKE LOAD

Design base shear $V = W x (Cv x I)/(R x T)$

Horizontal effect $E^H = NA$

3.11.3.12 Load combinations

Design and testing load cases:

- \cdot Case C1: T +P + W
- Case C2: Tinst $+P + W + Fw$
- Case C3: Tinst $+P + W + E^H$
- Case C4: Tinst +Ptest + W

Symbols**:**

 $P = Pd =$ design pressure $W =$ dead weight $T = T_{min} \rightarrow T_{max}$ T_{inst} = installation temperature T_{min} = min design temperature T_{max} = maximum design temperature F_w = horizontal wind load E^H = horizontal earthquake load

3.11.3.13 Technical analysis methods

GENERAL

All GRE pipelines including branches and expansion loops shall be detailed stress analysed by use of a recognised pipe stress analysis program.

PIPING STRESS ANALYSES

General GRE pipeline stress design.

The pipe stress calculations are performed by use of TRIFLEX Windows version 3.3.1, with stress code check according to BS 7159:

CIRCUMFERENTIAL STRESS

 $S_N = S_{N_D} + S_{Nb}$

CIRCUMFERENTIAL PRESSURE STRESS

 $S_{Np} = mp(D_i+t_d)/2t_d$

CIRCUMFERENTIAL BENDING STRESS

 $S_{Nb} = \{ (D_i + 2t_d)/2 \} \{ (M_i SIF_{Ni})^2 + (M_o SIF_{No}) 2 \}^{0.5}$

LONGITUDINAL STRESS

$$
S_x = S_{xp} + S_{xb}
$$

LONGITUDINAL PRESSURE STRESS

 $S_{xp} = p(D_i + t_d)/4t_d$

LONGITUDINAL BENDING STRESS

 $S_{xb} = \{(D + 2t)/2l\}(M_i^2 + M_{2}^O)^{0.5}$

TORSIONAL STRESS

 $S_s = M(D_i + 2t_d)/41$

MAXIMUM COMBINED STRESS:

 $S_{\text{CB}} = \{ (S_{\text{Sp}} + S_{\text{DB}})^2 + 4S_{\text{SB}}^2 \}^{0.5} \le S_{\text{design}}$

THERMAL EXPANSION DESIGN

Thermal end loads: According to FPI "Engineering Guide".

GUIDE SPACING

According to FPI "Engineering G uide".

Expansion joint design

Expansion loops

Rest, guide and anchor supports for drainage main pipes

Bending

NA

Thermal conductivity

NA

Heat tracing

NA

Vacuum or external pressure

NA

3.11.4 Calculations

3.11.4.1 GRE Pipeline calcul lations

Estimated GRE nominal pipe wall thicknesses and maximum pipe support distances (Lf) according to Future Pipe Industries:

Mechanical and Electrical S Calculation Report

Ponte sullo Stretto di Messina PROGETTO D EFINITIVO

System *Codice documento PI0009_F0.docx*

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4 Drainage system

4.1 Pupose

Calculations are carried out to sizes the the drainage systems in order to collect and treath first flush of rainwater from the bridge.

First flush rain is 5 mm evenly distributed rain water supplied to the bridge surface during 15 minutes (Rain intensity 20 mm/hr.).

First flush principle is argued that the first flush water will be the most polluted as regard content of oil spillage from roads. Second flush of rain (rain after five millimetres) is assessed to be more clean rain assuming that oil film on road pavement is being washed away during the first five millimetres of rain (first flush).

The "first flush" rain water are to be treated in oil separator on shore before outlet to the Messina Strait.

4.2 Design basis

4.2.1 Catchment area

The bridge is sloping from the middle towards each shore sides. The middle of the bridge is therefore the start of the catchment areas.

The total catchment area for each road girder section is 2.2 ha \sim 1.833 metres in length x 12m of width).

The total catchment area for the rail girder is 1.4 ha $($ \sim 1.833 metres in length x 7.5m of width).

4.2.2 Slopes

The design slope towards Calabria is 0.85 %.

The design slope towards Sicily is 1.5 %.

4.2.3 Spacing of gullies

For calculations the gullies are assumed spaced every 15 meters. However, this is only used for the assumption that an increase in pipe dimension can occur every 15 meters.

4.2.4 Drain pipe material

GRE (Glassfiber Reinforced Epoxy) pipes are proposed as drain pipe material.

The pipe roughness used for GRE is 1.5 mm. This is on the conservative side of what that can be expected during normal condition, but allows for some internal sedimentation.

4.3 Design peak flows ~ First flush principle 20 mm/hr

4.4 Carrier pipes

The drainage of each road girder will be facilitated by one carrier drain pipe in the entire length of the bridge starting from the middle.

The drainage of the railway will be facilitated by two carrier drain pipes in the entire length of the bridge starting from the middle.

4.4.1 Overview of pipes sections

Stretto di Messina

P-072889-C-7.51, Stormwater drainage

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Drainge of bridge - From centre of bridge and towards Calabria Design intensity 20 mm/hr

4.4.2 Calculation of road girder

Stretto di Messina

Drainage of road Girder - Towards Calabria (One GRP pipe with maximum 65% filling)

 $\begin{array}{c} 123 \\ 2,214 \end{array}$

 $1/5$

Ponte sullo Stretto di Messina PROGETTO DEFINITIVO

Mechanical and Electrical System Calculation Report

Codice documento

PI0009_F0.docx

Rev Data 20/06/2011

F0

4.4.3 Calculation of rail girder

Stretto di Messina
P072009-0-7.51. Semwate dainas

Drainage of rail Girder - Towards Calabria (Two GRP pipe with maximum 55% filling)

 $\begin{array}{c} 123 \\ 0,691875 \end{array}$

4.5 Sand trap

4.5.1 Dimensions

 $\frac{1}{1}$

4.5.2 Calculations of sand trap

Sand tran desi

Sana trap oesign interature reterences
i) BS EN 858-1:2002 and BS EN 858-2:2008, Separator systems for light liquids (e.g. oil and petrol)
ii) Winther, Leif et all, Spildevandsteknik, 1978, Figur 6.8 (inserted to the right

ny whites, can et al., Sedimentation and flotation, October 1986, Chapter 2 Principles of discrete settling
iii) Huisman, L., Sedimentation and flotation, October 1986, Chapter 2 Principles of discrete settling
v) Cejdire

Assumptions

4.6 Retention reservoir

The reservoir is designed to even out the flow to the oil and petrol separator thus maximizing the amount of drain water being treated before discharge to the sea.

The reservoirs will be designed for a higher return period than the gravity system on the bridge. This is to treat more drain water before discharge to the sea - without additional provisions of drain system on the bridge.

The storage volume of the retention chamber will therefore exceed the theoretically needed in order to even out the peak flows and be based on an estimated "first flush volume". - A 2,000 m3 retention reservoir is selected.

4.6.1 Calculation of retention reservoir

Q_{full} = full running capacity of drainage pipes

(*1) Full running pipes gives a total discharge of 326 l/s (~117 l/s/ha x 5.9 ha)

4.7 Oil and fuel separator

Oil/petrol separation shall comply with EN 858-1:2002 and EN 858-2:2003, Class I separators.

The capacity of the oil and petrol separator will have a capacity of 20 l/s.

This capacity is within the range of available prefabricated separators and one standard separator is therefore sufficient.

4.8 Down pipes

Since the bridge deck and the carrier pipe has the same slope it is assumed that the design peak flow towards the down pipes is the full running capacity of the carrier pipe (DN400)

Design peak flow (DN400)

 $(202 + 10\% \text{ safety})$

Vertical pipe - Wyly-Eatons formula

Branch section with 45 deg bend

% filling depth I - gradient Velocity

Calculation of air space at junction

Foot bend at ground level (45 deg)

Foot bend at ground level (discharge pipe)

VERY IMPORTANT: The discharge pipe shall at all circumstance be able to discharge freely (water level shall be kept below the Invert level)

OBS: The discharge velocity may be up to

5 Lightning protection and earthing

5.1 Need for lightning protection of the Messina Bridge

There are no devices nor methods preventing lightning discharges. Lightning flashes to, or nearby, structures (or services connected to the structures) are hazardous to people, to the structures themselves, their contents and installations as well as to services.

In accordance with lightning statistics the Calabria area is located in geographic area with low number of lightning per year. The statistic lightning frequency is shown shown in Fig. 6.1.

Fig.6.1 Densitá di fulmini al suolo in Italia (Guida CEI-81-3-1999)

The bridge over strait of Messina will be one of the significant structures in the World and it was in early phase of the project decided that this object shall be equipped with installations prowiding very high level of availability even in case of single failure in essential systems e.g. power supply system, ligting system, bridge marking etc. These reasons have led to a decision that the bridge shall be equipped with the highest class of lightning protection system LPS class 1. With reference to EN 62305 the following types of losses shall be considered:

- L1: loss of human life;
- L2: loss of service to the public;

- L3: loss of cultural heritage;
- L4: loss of economical value (structure and its content, service and loss of activity).

Loss of type L1, L2 and L3 may be considered as loss of social values, whereas loss of type L4 may be considered as purely economical loss.

Losses which may appear in a structure are as follows:

- L1: loss of human life:
- L2: loss of service to the public;
- L3: loss of cultural heritage
- L4: loss of economic value (structure and its content).

Losses which may appear in a service are as follows:

- L2: loss of service to the public;
- L4: loss of economic value (service and loss of activity).

The bridge is a tall structure over sea and will be exposed to lightning strokes. These lightning strokes will result in flow of lightning current along towers, cables and bridge deck and create potential danger to maintenance personnel (loss type L1) and loss of service to the trafficants (loss type L2).

The standard EN 62305-2 opens for possibility to reduce requirements to the LPS classification by means of an assessment of risks in form of a risk analysis. If agreed between the General Contractor and the Employer, such analysis may be carried out during the Projetto Esecutivo phase of the Works.

Overvoltages produced by lightning current will also cause danger for loss of service in case of missing overvoltage protection within mechanical and electrical installations installed on the deck, tower surface, anchor blocks etc. (loss type 2).

Lightning strokes may cause damage to electrical equipment installed on the bridge structures, if not protected (loss type L3).

The above standard operates with tolerability of losses of human life and services for the public. However, the requirements for very high availability of services, as well as need for protection of

important bridge construction elements do not allow for other choice than installation of highest class LPS and installation of LPMS protection measures for all essential electrical systems.

The following measures will be implemented:

- Protection measures to reduce physical damage lightning protection system (LPS) class 1
- Protection measures to reduce failure of electrical and electronic systems LEMP protection measures system (LPMS) consisting of earthing and bonding measures; magnetic shielding; line routing; coordinated SPD protection" .

Furthermore, in order to reduce loss of service the M&E installations are designed with route redundancy, redundant equipment, autonomous power generating sets, uninterruptible power systems, fluid storage systems, and automatic failure detection system are effective protection measures to reduce the loss of activity of the service.

5.2 Design of LPS

5.2.1 General

The LPS is intended to intercept direct lightning strikes to the structure and conduct the lightning current to the ground without causing thermal or mechanical damage.

The following standard is used for design of the LPS: EN 62305 Protection against lightning (Protezione contro i fulmini):

CEI EN 62305-1 **(CEI 81-10/1)** - Part 1: General principles (parte 1 : principi generali)

CEI EN 62305-2 **(CEI 81-10/2)** – Part 2: Risk management (parte 2 : valutazione del rischio)

CEI EN 62305-3 **(CEI 81-10/3)** – Part 3 Physical damage to structures and life hazard (parte 3 : danni materiali alla struttura e pericolo per le persone)

CEI EN 62305-4 **(CEI 81-10/4)** : Electrical and electronic systems within structures (parte 4 : impianti elettrici ed elettronici all'interno delle strutture)

5.2.2 Design basis

The design is based on EN 62305 standard. This standard defines a number of values which are relevant for the design of the LPS system.

Table 5 - Maximum values of lightning parameters according to LPL

Table 6 - Minimum values of lightning parameters and related rolling sphere radius corresponding to LPL

With respect to the threat of lightning, the following LPZs are defined:

An evaluation of the bridge construction has resulted in definition of zones on the bridge as shown in Fig. 6.2.2-1.

Fig. 6.2.2 Definition of lightning protection zones (LPZ)

In accordance to EN 62305-3 section 5.1.3 the external LPS can be constructed by means of use of natural components of the structure which will always be a part of the structure and will not be

modified (e.g. interconnected reinforcement steel, metal framework of the structure etc.).

The LPS consist of:

- 1. Air termination system
- 2. Down conductor system
- 3. Earth termination system

The external LPS is intended to intercept direct strikes to the structure (air termination system, including the sides of the structure), to conduct the lightning current to the earth (down-conductor system) and to disperse it into the earth (effective earth termination system).

The LPS system is designed as LPS class I in accordance with EN 62305-3.

5.2.3 Air termination system

The probability of structure penetration by lightning current is considerably decreased by the presence of a properly designed air termination system.

In case of a steel bridge the air termination system can best be composed of metal structure of the bridge.

In accordance to EN 62305 section 5.2.5 natural air-termination components should be considered.

The bridge structure consists of the following components which will be used as natural parts of the air-termination:

- 1. Steel towers
- 2. Towing wire along the walkway on the main cables
- 3. Steel cores of the main cables
- 4. Steel cores of the hangers
- 5. Steel deck and barriers along the deck
- 6. Lighting poles
- 7. Traffic sign portals

8. Catenary system portals

The above metal components have thickness greater than 0.5 mm and comply with the minimum requirements in table 3 in EN 62305-3.

The steel structure of towers and the bridge deck is welded or bolted together and provide solid electrical connection of its parts.

It is assumed that corrosion protection of the steel surface is not providing significant resistance to the lightning currents.

The other parts like lighting poles, metal barriers, steel cores in the cables and hangers will be electrically interconnected with other parts of LPS by means of stainless steel wires as bonding conductors.

The size of bonding conductors will comply with minimum requirements stated in EN 62305.

5.2.4 Down conductor system

The steel construction of the towers will be used as down conductor for the towers.

The cable hangers will be used as down conductors for the main cables, the steel wires along the walkway along the cables and the steel wire for the inspection vehicle along the cables.

The ends of the main cables at the towers will be electrically bonded with the steel structure of the towers. This bonding will be made by means of stainless steel wires with cross section of 95mm² which is greater than 50 mm² specified in Table 1 CEI/IEC 62305-4.

The cable ends in anchor blocks will be electrically interconnected with steel cable holders by means of bonding. This bonding will be made by means of stainless steel wires with cross section of 95mm² which is greater than 50 mm² specified in Table 1 CEI/IEC 62305-4.

In the terminal structures the down conductors will be constructed of electrically-continuous reinforced concrete framework of the structure as recommended in EN 62305-3, section 5.3.5. b) and c). As an additional security for good and reliable earth termination system in the bottom part of the foundation the terminal structure will be provided with a ring connection at the top of the terminal structure and electrically connected down conductors made of selected reinforcement bars in each four corners of the terminal structure. This construction will result that the whole terminal construction will work as both down conductors and earth termination system with reinforcement bars connected by binding and a number of reinforcement bars connected solidly by

clamps.

The electrical connection between the selected reinforcement bars will be made by means of clamping with factory manufactured clamps e.g. Dehn no.308 046, or similar.

All mentioned down conductors will provide several parallel connections for the lightning current.

In accordance with EN 62305 section 5.3.6 no test joints are required. However, the test can be carried out between terminal for bonding of the deck structure to the terminal earthing system and located at the top of the terminal structure (next to the bridge bearings) and the earthing busbar located inside the terminal bottom rum.

5.2.5 Earth termination system

All earth termination systems will be constructed in accordance to EN 62305-3 section 5.4.4, which recommends natural earth electrodes made of interconnected reinforcing steel in the foundation. This method will be used for tower foundations, terminal foundations and anchor blocks.

The earth terminations are conductive metal parts embedded in the concrete of the bottom part of the foundation structure. Concrete embedded directly in the ground has natural moisture content and can be considered as conductive matter, with conductivity similar to that of the earth. Because of the large area of this type of electrode, low resistance can be achieved. Furthermore, the concrete protects the metal parts against corrosion and steel electrode elements embedded in the concrete do not need any additional corrosive protection. Foundation earth electrodes are nowadays recommended as a very practical solution to external earthing electrodes.

Tests measurements of this type of earthing systems have shown that the resulting earthing resistance is far below 0,1 ohm and often lower than 0,01 ohm.

Principle of foundation earthing system is shown in Fig. 6.2.5.

Fig.6.2.5 Foudation earthing system principle for tower foundation

The foundation earth termination earth resistance can be calculated using the following simplified equation:

Where:

 R_A is earthing resistance in ohms (Resistenza di terra)

 $ρ_E$ is the specific resistivity of the soil ohm/m (Resistivita del terreno ($Ωm$))

d is the effective diameter of the foundation in m (Diametro del dispersore ad anello, dell'area equivalente o di un dispersore a semisfera (m))

The earthing resistances are calculated to be as shown in table 1.

Table 1 Earthing resistance calculations

The down-conductor system is arranged in such a way that from the point of strike to earth several parallel currentpaths exist, the length of the current paths is kept to a minimum and an effective equipotential bonding to conducting parts of the structure is performed.

For structures utilizing steel reinforced concrete (including pre-cast, pre-stressed reinforced units), the electrical continuity of the reinforcing bars shall be determined by electrical testing between the uppermost part and ground level. The overall electrical resistance is not be greater than 0,2 Ω and the reinforcing steel may be used as a natural down-conductor as discussed in EN 62305-3 sections 4.3 and 5.3.5.

Earthing plates (punto fisso di terra) for bonding/earthing connection to the foundation earthing system will be as Dehn type M, or similar.

5.3 Internal lightning protection

The purpose of construction of an internal LPS is to avoid the occurrence of dangerous sparking within the structure to metal constructions and electrical installation due to lightning current flowing in the external LPS or in other conductive parts of the structure.

A low impedance bonding network will be used to avoid dangerous potential differences between all equipment inside the inner LPZ.

All metallic constructions and installations in towers will bonded to the steel tower construction.

All metallic constructions and installations in terminals and anchor blocks will bonded to the earthing system in the concrete construction. The bonding will be carried out to earthing plates installed in the surface of the concrete structure. The earthing plates will be connected electrically to the down conductors/reinforcement bars inside the structure. The bonding cables will be either copper wires or stailless steel wires in areas with corrosive atmosphere.

It shall be mentioned that majority of cable trays/ladders will be made of fibreglass selfextinguishing plastic.

Equipotentialization will be achieved by interconnecting the LPS with:

- structural metal parts,
- metal installations,
- internal systems,
- external conductive parts and lines connected to the structure.

Since part of the lightning current may flow into electrical systems the installations will be equipped with surge protection devices (SPD).

Railway track is installed on the bridge as insulated from the steel structure of the bridge. In order to keep this principle bonding of the railway track will be carried out through rare-gas filled surge protectors, as shown in section 6.6.

5.4 Design and installation of a LEMP protection measures system (LPMS)

Electrical and electronic systems are subject to damage from the lightning electromagnetic impulse (LEMP). Therefore LEMP protection measures need to be provided to avoid failure of internal systems.

Protection against LEMP is based on the lightning protection zone (LPZ) concept: the volume containing systems to be protected shall be divided into LPZ. These zones are theoretically assigned volumes of space where the LEMP severity is compatible with the withstand level of the

internal systems enclosed (see Figure 6.2.2). Successive zones are characterized by significant changes in the LEMP severity. The boundary of an LPZ is defined by the protection measures employed.

Fig. 6.4-1 Definition of protection zones for a switchgear - suddivizione della centrale di controllo in zone di protezione da fulminazione LPZ

5.4.1 Medium voltage switchgear

The medium voltage switchboards will be equipped with lightning arresters in the feeder compartment.

The lightning aresters will be zinc-oxide (ZnO) varistorbased surge arresters.

Protection of medium voltage AC networks against both, multiple atmospheric and switching overvoltages as well as Very Fast Transients (VFT). Suitable for the protection of motors and cable sheaths. They will be of a type which is optimised for the use in link boxes of cable installations.

Fig. 6.4.1 Principle diagram - Schema di pricipio

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Fig. 6 3.1 Principle for SPD for medium voltage switchgear

Recommended values for MO arresters according to the continuous operating voltage U_c and the associated rated voltage U_c

¹⁾ Lower values are possible if the duration of the earth fault is accurately known.

² Higher values are set for generator transformers.

The nominal discharge current serves to classify MO arrester. According to IEC 60099-4 lightning

arresters can have classes: 2.5 kA, 5 kA, 10 kA and 20 kA.

For MV distribution systems commonly used classes are 5 kA and 10 kA. For lightning protection of the installations on a steel bridge with possibility for high induced current it is appropriate to use 10 kA class of lighting arresters.

Configuring MO arresters for 20kV network with solidly earthed neutral (minimum values, as check for recommendations in the table above) Rated voltage level $U_m = U_s = 24kV$ Standard lightning withstand voltage (BIL) of equipment = 125kV Maximum short circuit current = 12.5kA (in future 20kA) Maximum duration of temporary overvoltage: 10 s Required nominal discharge current I_N =10kA *Determining the minimally required continuous operating and rated voltage* $U_{C, min}$ = 1.05 x U_{S} /1.73 = 14.6 kV $U_{r1, min}$ = 1.25x $U_{C, min}$ = 18.2 kV $U_{r2,min}$ = 1.4 x (U_S / 1.73)/ k_{10s} = 1.4 x (24/1.73)/1 = 19.4 kV Chosen values: U_r > U_{r2min} = 21 kV; U_c = U_r /1.25 = 16.8 kV Creepage distance = 20 mm/kV x 24 kV = 480 mm Short circuit withstand capacity: 10 kA (typical value)

For 20 kV switchgear the surge arresters will comply with the following minimum requirements:

- Rated current: 10kA
- Operating duty impulse withstand current (4/10us): 100 kA
- Continuous operating voltage U_c : 20kV
- Rated voltage: 22kV
- Residual voltage at 20 kA (8/20 µs): 68kV
- Residual voltage at 40 kA (8/20 μs): 79kV
- Energy high current impulse: 5,3 kJ/kV Uc

For 6 kV switchgear the surge arresters will comply with the following minimum requirements:

- Rated current: 10kA
- Operating duty impulse withstand current (4/10us): 100 kA
- Continuous operating voltage U_c : 6kV

- Rated voltage: 7.5kV
- Residual voltage at 20 kA (8/20 μs): 20kV
- Residual voltage at 40 kA (8/20 μs): 22.5kV
- Energy high current impulse: 5,3 kJ/kV Uc

5.4.2 Low voltage switchgear

The low voltage switchgear will be equipped with overvoltage protection units.

In accordance to standards the lightning protection levels shall comply with the values given in Table 6.4.2-1.

In accordance with EN 62305 - 1 SPDs to be used according to their installation position are as follows:

- 1) At the line entrance into the structure (at the boundary of LPZ 1, e.g. at the main distribution board MB):
- SPD tested with *l*imp (typical waveform 10/350, e.g. SPD tested according to Class I);
- SPD tested with *In* (typical waveform 8/20, e.g. SPD tested according to Class II).
- 2) Close to the apparatus to be protected (at the boundary of LPZ 2 and higher, e.g. at secondary distribution board SB, or at a socket outlet SA):
- SPD tested with *In* (typical waveform 8/20, e.g. SPD tested according to Class II);

• SPD tested with a combination wave (typical current waveform 8/20, e.g. SPD tested according to Class III).

The surge protection devices will be from manufacturer Dehn, or similar.

Equivalents for SPD classificatio n

Table 6.4.2-2 Installation of SPD in zones - principle

Fig. 6.4.2-3 Classificazione dei dispositivi di protezione secondo CEI, IEC und EN

The SPDs shall be installed in all main switchboards. The SPDs shall comply with the following minimum specifications:

The SPD devices to be installed in sub-distribution switchboards shall comply with the following specifications:

 U_0 = Tensione nominale delle fasi verso terra

5.5 Railway

Railway power supply system shall be isolated from the bridge steel structure.

In order to provide potential equlisation of the railway track in case of lightning the steel track will be connected to the bridge earthing system through spark gaps based SDPs.

The protection level U_P of the SPD will be defined when the railway traction voltage has been agreed.

Installation principle for the SPD on the railway track is shown in Fig. 6.5-1.

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SDS

Dispositivo di limitazione tensione

- Separazione galvanica tra sezioni di binari isolati e parti d'impianto collegati a terra
- · Equipotenzialità sicura in caso di un corto circuito/ corto verso terra della linea di trazione, tramite la saldatura ad elevate correnti degli elettrodi
- · Anche in caso di scariche diretta da fulmini, non si verifica alcun corto circuito
- · Tenuta alla corrente di corto circuito fino a 25 kA_{eff} / 100 ms; 36 kA_{eff} / 75 ms

EQUIPOTENZIALIZZAZIONE ANTIFULMINE

SPINTEROMETRI DI SEZIONAMENTO

SDS ...: inserto spinterometrico SDS in esecuzione cilindrica, per l'inserimento nell'adattatore Siemens per binari, cod. 431.34

Nella norma CEI EN 50122-1 viene descritto l'utilizzo di dispositivi di limitazione nei sistemi ferroviari in corrente continua e corrente alternata, per la cosiddetta "messa a terra aperta di sistemi ferroviari" di parti conduttori nella zona della linea di trazione e del pantografo Per poter evitare, nei sistemi ferroviari a trazione elettrica, la formazione di sovratensioni pericolose tra i binari oppure sezioni di binari isolati verso parti d'impianto collegati a terra, vengono impiegati dispositivi di limitazione tensione (SDS ...) Essi hanno lo scopo di collegare in modo permanente le parti d'impianto
nella zona della linea di trazione e del pantografo con la linea di ritorno, nel caso in cui venga superata la tensione d'intervento. In caso di sovratensioni causate da eventi atmosferici, il dispositivo di limitazione tensione SDS ... possiede la capacità di ritornare nello stato
iniziale, dopo aver scaricato una corrente impulsiva. Solamente con il superamento della sollecitazione con corrente di fulmine indicata, avviene un corto circuito permanente tramite la saldatura ad elevata corrente degli elettrodi e la conseguente necessità di sostituzione dell'inserto di protezione. Il dispositivo di limitazione tensione SDS ... è composto dall'inserto spin-

terometrico ed il relativo set di connessione, adatto per il collegamento direttamente al binario oppure al palo della linea di trazione.

L'inserto di protezione spinterometrico, sviluppato da DEHN + SÖHNE,
tipo SDS 1, Art. 923 110, è stato omologato dall'Ente Ferroviaria Tedesca (FRA - Fisenhahn-Bundesamt)

Inserto spinterometrico tipo SDS, per l'inserimento nell'adattore Siemens per binari, cod. 431.34

Fig. 6.5-1 Principle for railway track potential equalisation

The traction current will return back to traction substations via the continous rail system. In such a direct current traction system where the negative of the traction supply is connected to the continous rail system, the bridge grounding system will through the foundation concrete reinforcement bars and soil provide an additional return path, in parallel with the track, for stray leakage current flowing back to the traction supply source. Particularly in the *case* of extensive structures such the bridge structure and the concrete reinforcement bars in the foundation, part of the stray current flowing into the soil through the concrete reinforcement bars may be picked up in

one area and discharge in another and finally leading to stray current corrosion. Although this in general will be mitigated by the isolation provided by the embedded rail system from Edilon to be installed, stray current driven corrosion will still be a risk. This have been further analysed in the document "*Stray currents, analysis and monitoring*" CG-1000- P-2S-D-P-IT-M3-SM-00-00-00-02.

5.6 Earthing system

5.6.1 General

The earthing and bonding shall comply with the Low Voltage Directive 2006/95/EEC, CEI EN IEC 60364 and IEC 61892.

5.6.2 MV Installations

The neutral point of the transformers will be directly connected to the system earth.

All metallic construction in the medium voltage rooms will be earthed to the earthing bar installation in these rooms.

The main earth reference points shall be earth bars. The earth bar for protective earth (PE) will be located in the switchgear and transformer rooms and the earth bar for instrument earth (IE) shall be located in the Instrumentation equipment room.

On the bridge deck earthing bar system will be established by means of earthing bars connected by welding to the bridge deck.

In towers the earthing bar system will be electrically connected to earthing bar welded to the tower surface.

If necessary earthing conductor system in the electrical room will be constructed of copper 24x4 mm fixed to steel walls in distance holders and finally connected to the earthing bars in both its ends.

Earth cables for earthing connections between the MV equipment and earthing bars will be 95mm² Cu.

Earth bars will be fabricated from copper and will be prepared with suitable drilled holes for the required size and number of connections.

The main PE bar shall act as the main connection point for the following equipment:

- 6/0,4kV transformers neutral point
- UPS systems neutral point
- Earth bars in MV and LV switchgear
- PE earth bars in instrumen t panels

5.6.3 LV Installations

The earthing system will be TN-S S system in accordance with IEC 60364.

Earthing of the LV switchgear will follw the same principle as for MV installations.

The earthing and equipotentila bondig bars will be installed in all electrical rooms. The equipotential bonding bars will be installed in all technical rooms.

Fig. 6.6.3 - 1 Equipotential bondi ng bar

The equipotential bonding bars will be used for direct connection of metallic mechanical and electrical installations.

All equipotential connections will not be less than 10 mm² copper in order to provide sufficient mechanical strength of the connection.

Equipment and items to be bond ed shall include:

- All metallic components of the structure which is not welded to the main structure
- Metallic enclosures of electrical equipment

- Metallic doors
- Stairs, ladders and railings
- Steel cable ladders and trays
- Piping systems
- Packaged units

In concrete structures the equipotential and earthing bars will be arranged on concrete wall and connected to the foundation earthing system via earthing plates with direct connection to the reinforcement bars, as shown in Fig. Fig. 6.6.3 - 2.

Fig. 6.6.3 - 2 Equipotential bondi ng bar

Fig. 6.6.3-3 Earthing plate point - Punto fisso di messa a terra

6 Radio Communication System

The purpose of the calculations in this section is to verify that the requirements of the Mechanical and Electrical Design Specification, doc.no. CG1000-P-2S-D-P-IT-M4-C3-00-00-00-06 are fulfilled.

The section contains the following calculations:

- Indicative calculations of link budgets, i.e. the RF-receiving levels and margins inside the bridge girders towers and anchor blocks;
- Indicative calculations of the availability of the radio communication system.

6.1 Link budgets

Calculations of the receiving levels inside the bridge girders, the towers and the anchor blocks are shown in the tables below together with simplified block diagrams.

6.1.1 Bridge girders

There are four TETRA repeaters at each side of the bridge. The repeaters are installed in the substations located between the road girder and the railway girder. Each repeater provides radio coverage of a section of approximately 960 m, viz. 480 m on each side of the repeater. Radio coverage in the girders is provided by leaky coaxial cable (radiating cable). RF-Taps are inserted in

the cable for tapping out a small portion of the RF signal which feeds a discrete antenna for coverage of a cross beam. The block diagram below shows a part of one radio section. The table shows the receiving level at the end of a 480 m long section.

6.1.2 Towers

There are two TETRA repeaters installed in each tower. Radio coverage is provided by leaky coax as shown on the figure below. An antenna is foreseen to cover the top cross beam (not shown). Calculation of the receiving level for the longest run in one of the legs is shown in the table below.

6.1.3 Anchor blocks

The two rooms in the anchor blocks are covered by discrete antennas being fed from a repeater installed in the substation next to the anchor blocks.

6.2 Availability

The availability of a section of the radio communication system caused by equipment failures can be calculated as shown below.

The figure below shows the radio equipment used in the calculation;

COM/BS: Communication switch / Base station

OMU: Optical Master Unit

REP: Optical fed RF repeater

The table below shows the required Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) values for each unit. It is assumed that a failure can be rectified within 4 hours, i.e. the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR).

The availability A is calculated for each unit from the formula: A = MTBF / (MTBF + MTTR).

Since the equipment is connected in series the resulting availability can be calculated as shown in table below:

The resulting availability for this radio section is 0.9998 or 99.98 % corresponding to an unavailability of 0.02 % or 1.75 hours per year.

6.3 Equipment for the radio communications system

The following paragraphs describe typical equipment to be installed for the radio communications system. All radio equipment will be for the 450 MHz frequency range.

Optical Master Unit

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The Optical Master Unit converts the RF-signals to light for feeding of the fibre fed repeaters.

Some typical characteristics are shown below:

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Fibre Fed Repeater – Typical characteristics:

SPECIFICATIONS

Frequency bands available (MHz):

Operator bandwidth Duplex distance Output power/carrier (DL)

5 MHz 10 MHz 1 carrier: +36 dBm, 2 carriers: +33 dBm, 3-4 carriers: +30 dBm 8 carriers: +27 dBm

Optical Module Electrical Specification

The leaky feeder cable for the 450 MHz frequency range will be as Radiflex or similar:

1/2" RADIAFLEX® RCF Cable

RCF12-50WFN/JFL

RF splitters/tappers are used to distribute the RF signals to the various areas in the bridge girders. Typical characteristics are shown below:

- Split ratios from 1000:1 to 2:1
- Tetra, PMR, Cellular, UMTS. **WiFi & WiMAX**
- Low specified PIM
- S00 W Avg Power Rating
- Minimal RF Insertion Loss
- ♦ RoHS compliant
- High Reliability, IP67
- \bullet N connectors

Microlab DN-x 4FN series of Tappers unevenly split high power cellular signals in fixed ratios from 1000:1 to 2:1 with minimal reflections or loss over the wireless bands in the range 350 - 2,700 MHz, (there is no coupling 1550 to 1650 MHz). The innovative asymmetric design ensures an excellent input VSWR and coupling flatness across the band, even down to a 2:1 split. If DC Continuity/AISG to the branch line is a requirement, see the DK-x4FN series.

The lightweight design allows easy attachment to a wall using the supplied bracket. Designed with only a few solder joints and an air dielectric, loss is minimized and reliability enhanced. (01/10)

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Typical characteristics for Indoor antennas:

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The 752.01.05.00 antenna is a broadband panel antenna suitable for indoor or outdoor coverage with TETRA and other UHF repeater systems. The dual-patch design gives the antenna stable radiation characteristics over a broad band of frequencies making the antenna ideal for a large range of indoor multichannel UHF repeater networks. The antenna is available with a snap-fit wall mounting bracket or pde mounting kit for easy installation, and can be supplied with connector and cabling options to suit application requirements.

Electrical & mechanical specifications

Handhelds and mobile TETRA radio terminals.

The operations and maintenance staff will be equipped with handhelds/mobile terminals as required.

The equipment will be as Selex , Sepura or similar. A selection of some of the options are show below:

Mobile terminal:

TECHNICAL DATA

Environmental specifications

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STP8000 Hand-Portable:

• Rugged

- High Power RF and Audio
- · Fully integrated, ultra-sensitive, GPS option
- . Fully integrated Bluetooth™ wireless interface option
- Automatic Man-Down reporting option
- Memory card, up to 32GB. eg. for document storage and applications
- · Supported by Sepura's market-leading software tools, including Radio Manager.
- A wide range of market leading accessories
- · End-to-End encryption requires only a software upgrade for activation?
- DMO Repeater ready (frequency efficient Type 1A option) with Call Participation

The STP8000 Hand-Portable is the most rugged TETRA hand-portable radio.

Designed and built to meet industry standard IEC529 IP55, it withstands day to day use in some of the harshest environments in the public safety, military, transport, and utilities markets.

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DIMENSIONS

Height: 133mm Width: 61mm (54mm) Depth: 32mm (Standard Battery) Depth: 37.5mm (High Capacity Battery)

WEIGHT

With Standard Battery <250g With High Capacity Battery <275g

FREQUENCY BANDS

300-344MHz - STP8030 344-400MHz - STP8035 380-430MHz - STP8038 407-473MHz - STP8040 806-870MHz - STP8080

POWER SUPPLY

7.4V (nominal) Lithium Polymer Battery Packs **Intelligent Reporting Batteries** 1260mAh Standard Battery 1400mAh Mid Capacity Battery 1880mAh High Capacity Battery

RF PERFORMANCE

RF Power - MS Power Class 3L (1.8 Watts) RF Power - customisable for TMO/DMO/REP Adaptive Power Control Supported Receiver Class - A and B Receiver Static Sensitivity -112dBm Receiver Dynamic Sensitivity -103dBm

PRODUCT PERFORMANCE

Audio Power - >1 Watt Operational Temperature -20°C to +60°C Storoge Temperature 40° to +85°C Dust & Water Protection IP55 Shock, Drop & Vibration ETS 300 019

PRODUCT OPTIONS

GPS **Rluatooth** Micro SD Card Man-Down Alarm³ DMO Repeater Type 1A Air Interface Encryption Options End to End Encryption Options Wide Range of Languages & Keymats

DISPLAY AND USER INTERFACE

Large 30x38mm Active LCD Area 176 x 220 pixels Transflective TFT Display, 262K colours Normal, Large & Very Large Mode Text 18 Configurable Soft Keys Vibrate Call/message Call History Phone Book (2000 entries) 3000 Talkgroups in TMO/DMO 255 Talkgroup Folders Quick Croups Transmit Inhibit with on/off Status messaging Fixed & definable Scan Lists Remaining Charge Time Indication

VOICE SERVICES

Full Duplex Calls (to MS and PABX/PSTN) Half Duplex Calls (Individual and Group) Priority Call Emergency Call (Pre-emptive Priority) **Talking Party Identity** Calling Line Identity Presentation **DTMF Dialling MSISDN Dialling Abbreviated Dialling** Dynamic Group Number Assignment Background (hidden) Groups **DMO** Individual Call **DMO Group Call** DMO Emergency Call DMO Intelligent Emergency Call

DATA SERVICES AND APPLICATIONS

Status Messaging (in TMO & DMO) SDS Messaging (in TMO & DMO) Multi-slot Packet Data Circuit Mode Data1 **TETRA Pager and Call Out¹ WAP Browsing** Short Data Applications Image & Map Storage on Memory Card Lone Worker Feature **Missed Event Application**

LOCATION BASED SERVICES

GPS Integrated Option 190dBw (-160dBm) Tracking Sensitivity **Bluetooth Location System** GPS Based Compass Over The Air GPS reporting using the following protocols:

- ETSI Location Standard Reporting (LIP)
- \cdot NMEA
- · Sepura Compact Messaging

SECURITY SERVICES

Authentication Class 1, 2 and 3 TETRA Security Air Interface Encryption TEA1/2/3/4 Supported² SMART Card E2E Encryption Support² Embedded E2E Encryption Support² Indigenous E2E Encryption Algorithm Support²

DMO REPEATER SERVICES (UCENCE REQUIRED)

DMO Voice Repeated DMO Tone Signalling Repeated Group Status & SDS Repeated Type 1A Efficient Operation over one Frequency Channel Presence Signal Support Emergency Call
Monitoring & Participation in Calls

CONNECTIVITY

TETRA V+D

Bluetooth Support for Voice and Data (PEI) PEI Data via RS232 and USB Data Cables Audio Connections via Rugged **Accessory Connector** High Speed Interface for Feature-rich Audio Accessories Audio and Data Connection via **Facility Connector**

ACCESSORIES

Personal Charger Vehicle DC Charger 1+1 Desktop Charger 6+6 Desktop Charger 12 and 24 Way Battery only Chargers Wide Range of Antennas **Studiand Belt Attachments** Rugged Belt Clip **Rugged and Soft Leather Cases Basic IP55 Remote Speaker Microphone** Advanced Remote Speaker Microphone with Integral Antenna Hands-Free Kit Personal Ear Pieces Feature-rich Car Kit Serial and USB Data Leads

7 Switchgear

7.1 MV Switchgear

Medium voltage switchgear shall comply with the technical minimum requirements stated in the document CG1000-P-2S-D-P-IT-M4-C3-00-00-00-02 General Specifications M&E Works. This requirements have been based on load flow and short circuit calculations presented in section 2.5 of this document.

The switchgear will be supplied by well renamed manufacturers having as minimum their service facilities in Italy. The switchgear to be installed inside land located substations will be withdrawable type standard metal-clad construction from e.g. Schneider (type SM6), or ABB Unigear Zs1, or similar. The switchgear to be installed in bridge substations will be fixed compact design substations as e.g ABB Safe Plus, or similar

Some data for these switchgear are presented below.

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SM6 range

Operating conditions

In addition to its technical characteristics. SM6 meets requirements concerning protection of life and property as well as ease of installation, operation and protecting the environment.

- SM6 units are designed for indoor installations (IP2XC).
- Their compact dimensions are:
= 375 mm to 750 mm wide;
-
- 1600 mm high;
- 840 mm deep...
a 840 mm deep...
... this makes for easy installation in small rooms or prefabricated substations. Cables are connected via the front.
- Studies are centralised on a front plate, thus simplifying operation.
The units may be equipped with a number of accessories (relays, toroids, instrument transformers, surge arrestor, telecontrol, etc.).

Standards

SM5 units meet all the following recommendations, standards and specifications: recommendations IEC:

- 60694: Common specifications for high-voltage switchgear and controlgear standards.
- 60271-200: A C metal-enclosed switchgear and controlgear for rated voltage above 1 kV and up to including 52 kV
- 60265: High voltage switches for rated voltages of 52 kV and above.
- 60420: High voltage alternating current switch-fuse combinations.
60255: Electrical relays.
-
- 62271-100. High-voltage alternating current circuit breakers. 62271-102: High-voltage alternating current disconnectors and earthing switches. UTE standards:

NFC 13.100: Consumer substation installed inside a building and fed by a second category voltage public distribution system

NFC 13.200: High voltage electrical installations requirements.

NFC 64.130: High voltage switches for rated voltage above 1 kV and less than 52 kV. NFC 64.160: Alternating current disconnectors and earthing switches. **EDF** specifications:

HN 64-S-41: A.C. metal-enclosed swichgear and controlgear for rated voltages

above 1 kV and up to and including 24 kV.
HN 64 S 43: Electrical independent operating mechanism for switch 24 kV 400 A.

Designation

SM6 units are identified by a code including:

an indication of the function, i.e. the electrical diagram code: IM, QM, DM1, CM, DM2, etc.

- the rated current: 400 630 1250 A:
- the rated voltage: 7.2 12 17.5 24 kV:
- the maximum short-time withstand current values:
- 12.5 16 20 25 kA.1 s;
- the colour is of RAL 9002 type (frosted satin white).
- Example for a unit designated: IM 400 24 12.5
- IM indicates an "incoming" or "outgoing" unit;
- 400 indicates the rated current is 400 A;
- 24 indicates the rated voltage is 24 kV;
- 12.5 indicates the short-time withstand current is 12.5 kA.1 s.

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SM6 range

Main characteristics

The hereunder values are for working temperatures from -5°C up to +40°C and for a setting up at an altitude below 1000 m.

Internal arc withstand: standard: 12.5 kA. 0.7 s;

enhanced:16 kA. 1 s.

Protection index:

- units: IP2XC (IP3X consult us);
- between compartments: IP2x.

The making capacity is equal to 2.5 times the short-time withstand current.
* 60 kV peak for the CRM unit.

General characteristics

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Endurance

 \blacksquare compartments: n electrical field:

- 40 dB attenuation at 100 MHz,
- 20 dB attenuation at 200 MHz;

Electro-magnetic compatibility: relays: 4 kV withstand capacity. as per recommendation IEC 60801.4;

a magnetic field: 20 dB attenuation below 30 MHz.

Temperatures:

The cubicles must be stored in a dry area free from dust and with limited temperature variations.

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-
- for stocking: from -40°C to +70°C,
■ for working: from -5°C to +40°C,
- other temperatures, consult us.
-

60420, three breakings at p.f. = 0.2

1730 A under 12 kV. 1400 A under 24 kV,

 \equiv 2600 A under 5.5 kV

SF6 circuit breaker cubicles

1 switchgear: disconnector(s) and earthing switch(es), in enclosures filled with SF6 and satisfying "sealed pressure system" requirements.

2 busbars: all in the same horizontal plane, thus enabling later switchboard extensions and connection to existing equipment.

3 connection and switchgear: accessible through front, connection to the downstream terminals of the circuit breaker.

Two circuit breaker offers are possible:

SF1: combined with an electronic relay and standard sensors (with or without an auxiliary power supply;

■ SFset: autonomous set equipped with an electronic protection system and special sensors (requiring no auxiliary power supply).

4 operating mechanism: contains the elements used to operate the disconnector(s), the circuit breaker and the earthing switch and actuate the corresponding indications.

5 low voltage: installation of compact relay devices (Statimax) and test terminal boxes. If more space is required, an additional enclosure may be added on top of the cubicle.

- Optional, cubicles may be fitted with:
- current and voltage transformers;
- circuit breaker control motorisation;
- surge arrestors.

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SM6 range

Factory-built cubicles description

Vacuum type circuit breaker cubicles

1 switchgear: disconnector(s) and earthing switch(es), in enclosure filled with SF6 and satisfying and one vacuum circuit breaker, "sealed pressure system" requirements.

2 busbars: all in the same horizontal plane, thus enabling later switchboard extensions and connection to existing equipment

3 connection and switchgear: accessible through front, connection to the downstream terminals of the circuit breaker.

Evolis: device associated with an electronic relay and standard sensors (with or without auxiliary source);

4 operating mechanism: contains the elements used to operate the disconnector(s), the circuit breaker and the earthing switch and actuate the corresponding indications.

5 low voltage: installation of compact relay devices (YIP) and test terminal boxes.
If more space is required, an additional enclosure may be added on top of the cubide.

Optional, cubicles may be fitted with:

current and voltage transformers;

circuit breaker control motorisation;

surge arrestors.

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SM6 range

Telecontrol of power distribution networks

SM6: an integrated range for telecontrol of MV networks.

 12001

SM6 switchgear is perfectly suited to a telecontrol environment due to options such as:

- Easergy T200 S telecontrol interface:
- independent power supply of electrical controls; auxiliary contacts for position and fault signalling;
-
- current sensors for fault detection.

Easergy T200 S: an interface designed for the telecontrol of MV networks

Easergy T200 S is an interface that is both 'plug and play" and multifunctional. It integrates all the functional features required for the remote monitoring and controlling of SM6:

- acquisition of various types of data: switch position, fault detectors, current values, etc.
-
- transmission of switch opening and closing orders.
- exchange with the control centre

Particularly called on during network incidents, Easergy T200 S has proven reliability and dependability in order to operate the switchgear whenever required. It is simple to install and to operate.

A functional unit dedicated to medium voltage networks

Easergy T200 S is installed inside the low voltage control cabinet of an IM and NSM SM6 for the telecontrol of one or two switches.

For switchboards up to 16 switches, the wall mounted version Easergy T200 I could be installed in the substation, and it is directly connected to the switches without any interface and converters.

It has a simple facia layout for local operation, allowing local control (local/remote) and enables visualisation of switchgear status.

It integrates a fault current detector (overcurrent and zero sequence) with detection thresholds that are configurable per channel (threshold and fault duration).

Ready to connect and secure

Integrated into SM6 low voltage control cabinet, it is provided ready to connect to the transmission system.

The version in cabinet for installation in the substation Easergy T2001 is provided with kits for switch interface and CTs. The connectors are foolproof to avoid any error during installation and maintenance.

Easergy T200 S has been subjected to severe testing in terms of MV electrical constraints.

A backup power supply guarantees continuity of service for several hours

for the electronic devices, the motorisation and the transmission system.

■ Current transformers are of split core type for easier installation.

Compatible with all telecontrol system (SCADA)

Easergy T200 S provides as standard the protocols: Modbus, DNP3.0 level 2 and IEC 870-5-101.

Numerous other protocols are also available (WISP+, HNZ, PUR, TG800, ...). The standard transmission system are: RS232, RS485, PSTN, FSK. Other transmissions are available on special request. Radio emitter/receiver is not supplied.

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SM6 range

Description of the control/monitoring and protection functions

The Sepam range of protection and metering is designed for the operation of machines and electrical distribution networks of industrial installations and utility substations for all levels of voltage. It consists of complete, simple and reliable solutions, suited to following 3 families:

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Sepam series 20,

- Sepam series 40,
- Sepam series 80.

Sepam protection relay

A range adapted at your application

- Protection of substation (incoming, outgoing line and busbars).
- Protection of transformers.
- Protection of motors, and generators.

Accurate measurement and detailed diagnosis

- Measuring all necessary electrical values.
- Monitoring switchgear status: sensors and trip circuit, mechanical switchgear status
- Disturbance recording.
- Sepam self-diagnosis and watchdog.

Simplicity

- **Easy to install**
- Light, compact base unit.
- Optional modules fitted on a DIN rail, connected using prefabricated cords.
- User friendly and powerful PC parameter and protection setting software to utilize all of Sepam's possibilities.

User-friendly

- Intuitive User Machine Interface, with direct data access.
- Local operating data in the user's language.

Flexibility and evolutivity

- Enhanced by optional modules to evolve in step with your installation.
- Possible to add optional modules at any time.
- Simple to connect and commission via a parameter setting procedure.

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Characteristics of the functional units

Functional units selection

SF6 type circuit breaker protection

DM1-A (750 mm) Single-isolation circuit breaker

DM1-D (750 mm) Single-isolation circuit breaker Outgoing line on right

DM1-D (750 mm) Single-isolation circuit breaker Outgoing line on left

Basic equipment:

- SF1or SFset circuit breaker (only for the 400-630 A performances)
- disconnector and earthing switch
- \blacksquare three-phase busbars
- circuit breaker operating mechanism RI
- disconnector operating mechanism CS
- \blacksquare voltage indicators
- three CTs for SF1 circuit breaker
- auxiliary contacts on circuit breaker
- connection pads for dry-type cables
- downstream earthing switch

three-phase bottom busbars

\blacksquare cubicle:

Dauxiliary contacts on the disconnector nadditional enclosure or connection enclosure for cabling from above **D** protection using Statimax relays, or Sepam programable electronic unit for SF1 circuit breaker
 D three voltage transformers for SF1 circuit breaker n key-type interlocks **050** W heating element n stands footing **D** surge arrestors circuit breaker: **D** motor for operating mechanism **D** release units Doperation counter on manual operating mechanism

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Characteristics of the functional units

Current transformers

For unit OMC

Transformer ARJP1/N2F

single primary winding;

double secondary winding for measurement and protection.

Short-time withstand current lth (kA)

For unit CRM

Transformer ARJP1/N2F

single primary winding;

double secondary winding for measurement and protection.

Short-time withstand current lth (kA)

Note: please consult us for other characteristics.

For 400 - 630 A units DM1-A, DM1-D, DM1-W, DM2, GBC-A, GBC-B

Transformer ARM3/N2F

double primary winding;

single secondary winding for measurement and protection.

Short-time withstand current Ith (kA)

* for 5 A protection

double primary winding;

double secondary winding for measurement and protection.

Short-time withstand current lth (kA)

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Characteristics of the functional units

Voltage transformers

For units CM, DM1-A, DM1-D, DM2, GBC-A, GBC-B

Transformers VRQ2-n/S1 (phase-to-earth) 50 or 60 Hz

For units CM2, GBC-A, GBC-B

Transformers VRC2/S1 (phase-to-phase) 50 or 60 Hz

Surge arrestor

For units IM500, DM1-A, DM1-W, GAM, DMV-A*, DMV-S*

Note: the rated voltage of the surge arrestor is according to unit's rated voltage. (*) limited up to 17.5 kV for DMV-A and DMV-S circuit breaker cubicles.

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Switch units

the switch can be closed only if the earthing switch is open and the access panel is in position. the earthing switch can be closed only if the switch

is open.

the access panel for connections can be opened only if the earthing switch is closed.

the switch is locked in the open position when the access panel is removed. The earthing switch may be operated for tests.

Circuit-breaker units

■ the disconnector(s) can be closed only if the circuit breaker is open and the access panel is in position interlock type 50.

the earth switch(es) can be closed only if the disconnector(s) is/are open.

the access panel for connections can be opened only if:

□ the circuit breaker is locked open,

□ the disconnector(s) is/are open, □ the earth switch(es) is/are closed.

Note: it is possible to lock the disconnector(s) in the open position for no-load operations with the circuit breaker.

Installation

Functional interlocks

These comply with IEC recommendation 60271-200 and EDF specification HN 64-S-41 In addition to the functional interlocks, each disconnector and switch include:

built-in padlocking capacities (padlocks not supplied);

four knock outs that may be used for keylocks (supplied on request) for mechanism locking functions.

Unit interlock

Units dimensions

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Interruttore con sezionatore e arrivo cavi
DM1-R (750 mm)
(SFset - SF1)

ABB Unigear ZS1

IEC electrical characteristics of UniGear ZS1 - Single Busbar System

1) For other versions, please refer to the chapters no. 2 (Double Busbar System) and chapter no. 3 (Marine Applications).
2) GB/DL version is available with higher request in dielectric characteristics (42 KV) and short ti

Figure 54: Overview of a system using Station Automation COM600

SafeRing / SafePlus

SafeRing / SafePlus con interruttore i n vuoto in accordo alla norma IEC 60056

In questa unità, il trasformatore è protetto mediante un interruttore in vuoto combinato con relè e trasformatori amperometrici.

I relè in dotazione sono basati sulla tecnologia digitale e non richiedono l'uso di un alimentatore esterno. Per ulteriori informazioni, consultare i cataloghi tecnici SafeRing e SafePlus.

The switchgear for 12kV can be operated at 6kV level.

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Technical data

1) Depending on the current rating of the fuse

2) Limited by High Voltage fuse

3) Other ratings available on request

4) Only valid with 400 series bushings

SafeRing is lested according to IEC publications IEC 60265, IEC 60129, IEC 60056, IEC 60420, IEC 60694 and IEC 60298

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SafePlus is a metal enclosed compact switchgear system for up to 24 kV distribution applications. The switchgear has a unique flexibility due to its extendibility and the possible combination of fully modular and semi modular configurations.

When SafePlus is used in a fully modular configuration with covered external busbars, SafePlus is a metal clad switchgear. When combined with SafeRing, which is ABBs standard ring main unit, they represent a complete solution for 12/24 kV distribution networks

SafePlus and SafeRing have identical user interfaces.

SafePlus is a completely sealed system with a stainless steel tank containing all the live parts and switching functions

A sealed steel tank with constant atmospheric conditions ensures a high level of reliability as well as personnel safety and a virtually maintenance-free system. As an option an external busbar can be provided to obtain full modularity.

This external busbar kit has to be mounted to the switchgears on site. And it is fully insulated and screened to ensure the reliability and climatic independence.

The SafePlus system offers a choice of either a switch fuse combination or a circuit breaker with relay for protection of the transformer. SafePlus accommodates a wide selection of protection relays for most applications

SafePlus can also be supplied with or retrofitted with remote control and monitoring equipment

SF₆ insulated SafePlus/SafeRing CSG / RMU

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SafePlus (not M module) is supplied with the following standard equipment:

Earthing switches (not D module)

- Operating mechanisms with integral
- mechanical interlocking
- Operating handle
- Facilities for padlocks on all switching functions
- Bushings for cable connection in front (not SI, Sv and Be module)
- Cable compartment cover
- Manometer for SF6 pressure/
- density monitoring
- Lifting lugs for easy handling

V- Vacuum Circuit Breaker 4.4

Technical data

Depth: 765 mm Width: 325 mm Height: 1336 mm

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Standard features

- 200 A VCB for transformer protection or
- 630 A VCB for feeder protection
- Two positioning double spring mechanism for VCB
- Three positioning Isolator/Earthing switch downstream VCB
- Three positioning single spring mechanism Isolator/Earthing switch
- Interlocking between VCB and Isolator/Earthing switch
- Switch positioning indication for VCB and Isolator/earthing switch
- Self powered electronic protection relay with ring core CTs on cables (only standard on 200 A)
- Inp coil (for relay tripping)
- Cable bushings horizontally in front. 200 series plug in (200 A VCB) with integrated voltage sensor for voltage indication 400 series bolted (630 A VCB) with integrated voltage
	- devider for voltage indication
- Cable compartment cover allowing surge arrestor type Raychem RDA and double cable connection with
- ABB Kabeldon cable adapters
- Busbars, 630 A
- Earthing bar

Optional features

- Bushings for connection of external busbar
- Cable bushings
	- 400 series plug-in
	- 600 series bolted
	- 400 series bolted combisensor with integrated screen for voltage indication and integrated sensor for current and voltage monitoring
- Interlocking
	- Cable compartment front cover interlocked with earthing switch
- Arc suppressor (only for 630 A version)
- Signal (1NO) from arc suppressors wired to terminals (only one each SF6 tank)
- Signal (1NO) from internal pressure indicator wired to terminals (only one each SF6 tank)
- SF_R insulated Compact Switchgear and Ring Main Unit NOPOWSR6104GB

Optional features also available as retrofit

- External busbars
- Trip coil open
- Trip coil open and close
- Motor operation for VCB
- Low voltage compartment / Top entry box
- Capacitive voltage indicator
	- HR-module (Voltage Detecting System, VDS, acc. to IEC 61243 5, alternatively VPIS, acc.to IEC 61958 with integrated indicator lamps (LED)
	- Indicator lamps, 3-phase VIM-3
	- Indicator lamp, 1-phase VIM-1, alternatively VPIS, acc.to IEC 61958
	- with integrated indicator lamps (LED)
- Short circuit indicators (only 630 A VCB)
	- Horstmann Alpha/E
	- Horstmann Alpha/M
	- Horstmann Gamma
- Short circuit and earth fault indicator (only 630 A VCB)
	- Horstmann Delta/E
- Cable compartment cover
	- with window
		- with extra depth (double 1, surge arrestors)
		- arc proof (if existing module have interlocked cable
		- compartment)
- Auxiliary switches
	- Vacuum circuit breaker position 2NO+2NC
	- Disconnector position 2NO+2NC
	- Earthing switch position 2NO + 2NC
	- Vacuum circuit breaker tripped signal 1NO
- Cable support bars, non-magnetic or adjustable
- Ronis key interlock on disconnector earthing switch
- Advanced relays type SPAJ, REF and others.

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 -6

F0

SF₆ insulated
CSG / RMU SafePlus/SafeRing

The Arc Suppressor is an optimal quick-make short circuit device with a mechanical pressure detector that can be installed with each incoming feeder inside the sealed SF6 tank of the SafeRing and SafePlus switchgear.

Arc Suppressor

If an arc fault should occur inside the SF6 tank the pressure detector of the Arc Suppressor will automatically trip the short circuit device of the incoming feeder(s) within milliseconds, thereby transforming the arc fault into a bolted tault

The arc is extinguished without any emission of hot gases and the bolted short circuit will be interrupted by the upstream circuit breaker.

No links or release mechanisms are installed outside the tank Corrosion and any enviromental influences are therefore prevented, giving optimum reliability.

The pressure detector is insensitive to pressure changes due to variation in atmospheric temperature or pressure as well as external phenomena such as vibrations or shocks.

The arc suppressor will operate for short-circuit currents in the range of 1kArms to 21kArms and it will reduce the generated arc energy to less than 5% of the arc energy released during an arcing time of 1 sec.

A signalling device (1NO) will indicate local or remote the tripping of one or more arc suppressors.

Since the system is self-contained, an internal arc fault will have no impact on the surroundings. No arc fault tests have to be repeated in combination with channel release systems or transformer stations.

The costs of the cleaning work which has to be done after an internal arc fault when the release flap has opened, are reduced to zero

Ponte sullo Stretto di Messina PROGETTO DEFINITIVO

Ring core current transformers and earth fault transformer

REF SafePlus

Protection:

- non-directional overcurrent protection, 3 stages
- directional overcurrent protection, 3 stages
- non-directional earth-fault protection
-
- directional earth-fault protection
- residual overvoltage protection
- 3-phase thermal overload

(configurable functions)

- 3-phase overvoltage protection
- 3-phase undervoltage protection
- Under- or overfrequenzy incl. rate of change, 5 stages

Technology summary REF SafePlus and REF542plus:

Optional functionality

- Capacitor bank protection

- Capacitor bank control
- Power quality
- Measurement:
- 3-phase current
- neutral current
- 3-phase voltage
- residual voltage
- 3-phase power and energy incl cos phi
- transient disturbance recorder

Ponte sullo Stretto di Messina PROGETTO DEFINITIVO

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Le unità REF541/543/545 fanno parte della serie RE500 e sono progettate per la protezione e il controllo dei quadri elettrici e per essere inserite in sistemi di - Guasto a terra 3 soglie automazione delle sottostazioni. Grazie all'impiego di tecnologia digitale integrata, le unità REF offrono funzioni complete di misura, protezione, controllo e monitoraggio

Tutte le funzioni necessarie sono presenti in un unico dispositivo. Di conseguenza vengono ridotti l'impiego di apparecchiature accessorie e delle operazioni di cablaggio del quadro.

Il software di configurazione di uso semplice e intuitivo permette di realizzare configurazioni specifiche.

L'interfaccia grafica consente di visualizzare gli eventi. lo stato dei dispositivi, le misure, gli allarmi, ecc. adattandosi alle varie esigenze di impianto.

l e unità REF541/543/545 dispongono di un unico sistema di configurazione comune a tutta la serie 500 facilitandone notevolmente l'utilizzo da parte degli operatori.

L'ampia gamma di protocolli di comunicazione consente il collegamento e l'integrazione nel sistema di gestione dell'impianto.

Catalogo tecnico: 1MRS751818.

REF 541/543/545

Unità multifunzione di protezione, controllo e automazione di sottostazione

- · Facile modifica e adequamento delle funzioni attraverso il software di configurazione
	- · Interfaccia operatore di tipo grafico con display a cristalli liquidi
	- · Hardware e software modulari
	- · Unità di campo per sistemi di automazione di sottostazione
	- · Accurata localizzazione dei guasti
	- · Monitoraggio delle condizioni operative
	- · Unica tipologia di ricambi e accessori: un solo tipo di hardware
- · Drastica riduzione della manutenzione preventiva, forte limitazione dei quasti causati da manomissioni ed errori

Protezioni

- Autorichiusura fino a 5 cicli
- Discontinuità di fase
-
- Guasto a terra direzionale 3 soglie
- Massima corrente di fase 3 soglie
- Massima corrente di fase direzionale 3 soglie
- Massima e minima frequenza 1...5
- Funzione di inrush
- Massima tensione 3 soglie
- Minima tensione 3 soglie
- Massima tensione residua 3 soglie
- Synchrocheck
- Sovraccarico termico
- Protezione banchi di rifasamento
- Controllo banchi di rifasamento
- Sovraccarico termico con sonde PT100
- Carico shilanciato
- Controllo fattore di potenza

Mierino

- Corronti di faso
- Corrente di terra residual
- Tensione di fase
- Tensione residua
- Potenza, energia e fattore di potenza
- Registrazione transitori e disturbi
- Localizzazione guasti per cortocircuito e quasto a terra

Monitoraggio Power Quality

- Misura della distorsione della forma d'onda della corrente
- Misura della distorsione della forma d'onda della tensione
- Fluttuazione della tensione

Ingressi e uscite

- Fino a 34 ingressi digitali
- Fino a 26 uscite digitali incluse 2 uscite per supervisione intervento per sgancio
- 8 ingressi RTD/DT100
- Sincronizzazione a mezzo ingresso hinario
- -4 uscite $4...20$ mA

Ingressi analogici

- Connessioni per 4 trasformatori di corrente 1 A e 5 A
- Connessioni per 1 trasformatore di corrente 0,2 A e 1 A
- Connessioni per 4 trasformatori di tensione 100 V e 120 V
- 9 ingressi per sensori di corrente/tensione

Comunicazione

LON / SPA / Modbus / DNP 3.0 / PRO-FIBUS / IEC 61850 / IEC 60870-5-103

Monitoraggio condizioni operative

- Supervisione interventi
- Guasto fusibili
- Usura interruttore
- Tempo corsa interruttore
- Nr manovre interruttore
- Tempo di inattività interruttore
- Allarme per manutenzione program-
- moto
- Tempo di carica delle molle di chiusura
- Supervisione misure
- Allarme pressione gas
- Temporizzatori

Appendix A – Max. voltage calculation scenario 1

Appendix B – Min. voltage calculation scenario 1

Appendix C – Min. voltage calculation scenario 2

Appendix D – Min. voltage calculation scenario 3

Appendix E – Min. voltage calculation motor start

Appendix F – Max. short circuit calculation scenario 1

Appendix G – Min. short circuit calculation scenario 2

